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ABSTRACT 
A defining problem of the Information Age is securing computer 
databases of ultrasensitive personal information. These reservoirs of data 
fuel our Internet economy but endanger individuals when their information 
escapes into the hands of cyber-criminals. This juxtaposition of 
opportunities for rapid economic growth and novel dangers recalls similar 
challenges society and law faced at the outset of the Industrial Age. Then, 
reservoirs collected water to power textile mills: the water was harmless in 
repose but wrought havoc when it escaped. After initially resisting Rylands 
v. Fletcher’s strict-liability standard as undermining economic 
development, American courts and scholars embraced it once the economy 
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matured and catastrophes such as the Johnstown Flood made those 
hazards impossible to ignore. 
Public choice analysis suggests that a meaningful public law response 
to insecure databases is as unlikely now as it was in the early Industrial 
Age. The Industrial Age’s experience can, however, help guide us to an 
appropriate private law remedy for the new risks and new types of harm of 
the early Information Age. Just as the Industrial Revolution’s maturation 
tipped the balance in favor of early tort theorists arguing that America 
needed, and could afford, a Rylands solution, so too the Information 
Revolution’s deep roots in American society and many strains of 
contemporary tort theory support strict liability for bursting cyber-
reservoirs of personal data instead of a negligence regime overmatched by 
fast-changing technology. More broadly, the early Industrial Age offers 
valuable lessons for addressing other important Information Age problems. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The emerging technologies of our Information Age will redefine 
accidents as we know them.1 The characteristic dangers of this century’s 
information technologies fundamentally differ from those posed by the 
technologies propelling last century’s economy. Whereas twentieth-century 
technologies largely wrought environmental and bodily harm, a salient 
issue at the dawn of the Information Age is the release of sensitive personal 
information from computer databases into the hands of identity predators 
and corporate thieves.2 As we head into uncharted territory, we can learn 
much from the law’s response to newly emerging risks at the dawn of the 
previous economic era. 
The dynamics of the early Industrial Age, a time of great potential and 
peril, parallel those at the advent of the Information Age. Then, as now, 
technological change brought enormous wealth and comfort to society. 
Industry thrived as a result of machines powered by water-reservoirs. But 
 
 1. See generally MARTIN REES, OUR FINAL HOUR: A SCIENTIST’S WARNING: HOW TERROR, 
ERROR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER THREATEN HUMANKIND’S FUTURE IN THIS CENTURY—ON 
EARTH AND BEYOND (2003) (discussing threats arising in the wake of recent developments in bio-, 
cyber-, and nanotechnology); Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, WIRED, Apr. 2000, available 
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy_pr.html. 
 2. See U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, INFORMATION COMPROMISE AND THE RISK OF IDENTITY 
THEFT: GUIDANCE FOR YOUR BUSINESS (June 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/ 
business/idtheft/bus59.pdf [hereinafter FTC, INFORMATION COMPROMISE]; John Leland & Tom Zeller, 
Jr., Technology and Easy Credit Give Identity Thieves an Edge, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2006, at A1; 
Senator Clinton Speaks on Privacy Rights to American Constitution Society, U.S. FED. NEWS, June 16, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 10544222. 
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when the dams holding those reservoirs failed, the escaping water caused 
massive property and personal damage different from the interpersonal 
harms of the previous century.3 Rylands v. Fletcher4 provided the Industrial 
Age’s strict-liability response to the accidents caused by the valuable 
reservoirs’ escaping water. The history of Rylands’s reception in Britain 
and the United States reflects the tension between that era’s desire for 
economic growth and its concern for security from industrial hazards.5 
Computer databases are this century’s reservoirs. Today, databases of 
personal identifying information in the private sector ensure the seamless 
flow of commerce.6 Social Security numbers (“SSNs”) facilitate loans and 
instant credit. Employers and colleges use SSNs to identify employees and 
students. Over 1000 companies collect and sell our sensitive personal 
information.7 Databases of biometric information—fingerprint, retinal, iris, 
and facial images—increasingly authenticate retail transactions, secure 
workplaces, and provide access to corporate computer networks. Much as 
water reservoirs drove the Industrial Age, computer databases fuel the 
Internet economy of our Information Age.8 
Today’s cyber-reservoirs are safe so long as the sensitive personal 
data remains inside. But because such cyber-reservoirs are “treasure 
chests” for criminals, data-security breaches are increasingly prevalent.9 
When sensitive personal information escapes into the hands of thieves, 
great havoc can result. Just as the new technologies of the Industrial Age 
changed the nature of accidents, information technologies present new 
harms, ranging from identity theft and criminal impersonation to stalking 
 
 3. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 350, 364–65 (3d ed. 2005); 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) (highlighting a shift in 
the late nineteenth century from wrongs, such as assault and battery, to those involving the “incidents” 
of industry). 
 4. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330 (H.L.). 
 5. See infra Part V.B. 
 6. See Leland & Zeller, supra note 2. 
 7. Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to 
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003). See also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL 
PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 16–26 (2004) (discussing the history 
of private sector databases). 
 8. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 350–68. 
 9. See Phillip Britt, Survey: Government Struggles with Data Breaches, INFO. TODAY, Jan. 1, 
2006, at 48 (“Like thieves [who] rob banks because ‘that’s where the money is,’ computer attackers 
target databases because that’s where the data is.”); Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of 
Data Breaches Since the ChoicePoint Incident, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronData 
Breaches.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Privacy Rights, Chronology]. 
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and corporate espionage.10 The emerging technologies at the dawn of the 
Information Age bring great value and new risks to individuals. 
We face a dilemma similar to that of the past: striking a balance 
between the social goals of economic growth and individual safety. 
Although the hazardous nature of today’s valuable cyber-reservoirs are 
clear, many questions remain. How can the law motivate those collecting 
sensitive personal data to secure it? What role can, and does, public law 
play in solving this problem? To what extent should private law operate to 
promote data security at the dawn of this Information Age? How should 
private law conceptualize harm in the twenty-first century, a time when an 
individual’s autonomy increasingly depends on the individual’s market 
identity? 
In answering these questions, this Article develops three distinct, but 
interlocking, themes. First, it proposes a Rylands strict-liability model to 
address the hazards of leaking databases and explains why both the public 
law and negligence-based solutions suggested in the current literature are 
likely to prove impractical. Second, it explores parallels in the challenges 
presented by the new technologies at the dawn of the Industrial Age with 
those at the outset of the Information Age. Third, it looks at the influence 
economic development has on legal theory across those eras. 
Each of these themes is critical to the others. The history of the 
Industrial Age’s reservoirs helps us appreciate that the problem of insecure 
databases is not an entirely novel one. Analyzing the patterns of economic, 
intellectual, and legal change at the dawn of the Industrial Age provides a 
preview of similar conflicts at the outset of the Information Age. The 
insecure database dilemma also illuminates the changing conception of 
personal harm that accompanies the genesis of new economic eras. 
Part II of this Article describes the massive collection of sensitive 
personal information in private-sector computer databases and the hazards 
the release of such data can pose. Part III explores the prospects of a public 
law solution to today’s insecure databases. Although states have made 
some progress, no comprehensive federal legislation addresses the 
collection of sensitive personal data held by private industry. Public choice 
 
 10. See FTC, INFORMATION COMPROMISE, supra note 2; Peter P. Swire, Efficient Confidentiality 
for Privacy, Security, and Confidential Business Information, 2003 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON 
FIN. SERVS. 273, 290, available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/brookings-wharton_papers_on_ 
financial_services/v2003/2003.1swire.html; Leland & Zeller, supra note 2; David Stout, Veterans 
Agency to Atone with Free Credit Monitoring, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at A17. 
CITRO10 1/31/2007 9:40:58 PM 
246 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:241 
theory suggests that no meaningful law can be expected any time soon. 
This leaves a significant void to fill. 
Part IV explores how economic and moral views come together in 
finding negligence inadequate to address the insecure database problem. It 
explores the uncertainty database operators will face in attempting to 
comply with a negligence standard given the rapidly changing risk 
environment, which undermines efficient deterrence. Part IV then 
highlights the significant residual risk of data leaks that will remain even if 
database operators employ safety precautions. The high utility and high risk 
of information reservoirs suggest their treatment as an ultrahazardous 
activity for which negligence is an inefficient cost-spreading and deterrence 
tool. It concludes by arguing that a negligence regime will be unable to 
establish norms for reasonable information security practices. 
Part V looks to the law’s treatment of technological change at the 
threshold of the Industrial Age to address the novel challenges at the outset 
of the Information Age. It describes Rylands v. Fletcher and surveys the 
different schools of thought that responded to Rylands in England and in 
the United States. Part V explores how Industrial Age jurists and 
intellectuals embraced Rylands once the economy matured and public 
anxiety about bursting reservoirs and other industrial hazards intensified. 
Part VI argues that the economic and intellectual trends at the outset 
of the Information Age are aligned in a manner similar to that at the time of 
Rylands’s adoption. Rylands provides a powerful metaphor to 
conceptualize the contributions and the dangers engendered by the new 
technologies of the Information Age, particularly the insecure cyber-
reservoirs of personal data. Part VI argues that just as the Industrial Age 
recognized new and different harms, the new injuries of the Information 
Age, namely those involving the compromise of our personal independence 
and market identity, ought to be recognized and redressed. 
II.  CYBER-RESERVOIRS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
For the first half of the twentieth century, private and public entities 
engaged in the time-consuming task of gathering personal information by 
using paper-filing systems.11 Computers, however, radically changed the 
 
 11. See ELTING E. MORISON, MEN, MACHINES, AND MODERN TIMES 54 (1966) (explaining that 
certain government employees spent their “whole lives” assembling the medical and salary records of 
U.S. soldiers in paper-filing systems during the early part of the twentieth century); SOLOVE, supra note 
7, at 14. 
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speed and breadth of data collection over the past fifty years.12 Until 
recently, computers doubled their power about every eighteen months.13 In 
June 2006, IBM researchers broke the speed record for silicon-based 
chips.14 In the near future, semiconductors operating 250 times faster than 
those currently in production may become commercially available.15 
Just as data processing has rapidly advanced, so has the storage of 
information.16 In the past two years, the country’s largest databases have 
tripled in size,17 while data collection costs have fallen by half.18 
ChoicePoint, an information broker, collects and sells the personal 
information of over 220 million adults—an amount equivalent to “21 
million miles, if printed out on copy paper carefully laid end to end,” or 
roughly 77 trips around the moon.19 As Microsoft founder Bill Gates 
recently remarked of our Information Age, “we’re always in a time of utter 
change, maybe even accelerating change.”20 
Given the speed and efficiency of storing digital data, nearly all 
businesses maintain cyber-records.21 This Part surveys the ultrasensitive 
digital data collected by information brokers, colleges, private employers, 
 
 12. ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 4–5 (2005). 
 13. Nathan Myhrvold, Moore’s Law Corollary: Pixel Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2006, at G3. 
 14. Laurie J. Flynn, Researchers Say New Chip Breaks Speed Record, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2006, at C7. 
 15. See id.; Press Release, IBM, IBM and Georgia Tech Break Silicon Speed Record (June 20, 
2006), http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/19843.wss (explaining that the recent 
breakthrough will “redefine[] the performance limits of silicon-based semiconductors” and that IBM 
will be working closely with academic and industry partners to deliver a new generation of high-
performance, energy-efficient microprocessing). 
 16. Daniel B. Prieto, Data Mine, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 2005, at 17. See also John Markoff & 
Saul Hansell, Hiding in Plain Sight, Google Seeks an Expansion of Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, 
at A1 (describing Google as a leader in the effort to build a network of supercomputers that can process 
more data and searches at speeds constrained only by the speed of light). 
 17. See J. Nicholas Hoover, High–Stakes Data Mining, INFO.WEEK, May 22, 2006, at 21, 23. 
 18. Jon William Toigo, Data—The Squeeze Is on—Today’s Digital Data Explosion Is the Stuff of 
Legend, NETWORK COMPUTING, Nov. 24, 2005, at S3. See also JEFFREY W. SEIFERT, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, REPORT NO. RL31798, DATA MINING AND HOMELAND 
SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 2 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL31798.pdf 
(noting that the decreased cost of data storage has contributed to the nation’s increasing interest in data 
mining). 
 19. O’HARROW, supra note 12, at 145. See also Joseph Menn, ChoicePoint Is Fined for Data 
Breach, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at C1 (noting that ChoicePoint stores 19 billion records). 
 20. John Markoff, Gates’s Lieutenants Look Ahead, Hoping to Avoid Other Companies’ 
Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2006, at C1. 
 21. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOC. SEC. NUMBERS: MORE COULD BE DONE TO 
PROTECT SSNS, GAO REP. NO. GAO-06-586T, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON SOC. SEC., 
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. 3 (Mar. 30, 2006) (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing 
Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06586t.pdf [hereinafter GAO, MORE COULD BE DONE]. 
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and biometric vendors.22 Section A describes the widespread use and 
storage of SSNs. Section B explores how private-sector databases will 
increasingly amass fingerprint, iris, and retinal images to secure 
workplaces, computer systems, and retail transactions. Section C highlights 
the risks that the release of such personal data entails. 
A.  SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS 
The SSN stands as our de facto national identifier.23 According to the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), it would be “almost impossible” to 
conduct business without storing the SSNs of customers, employees, or 
students in computer databases.24 Companies employ SSNs to track 
customer transactions.25 Employers use SSNs to perform background 
checks, report payroll taxes, and identify employees.26 Universities and 
colleges collect the SSNs of students and alumni.27 Third-party vendors 
 
 22. This Article focuses on the collection of sensitive personal information by the large section 
of the private sector that is likely to remain unregulated by federal law. See infra text accompanying 
notes 98–108. 
 23. BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN 
WORLD 114 (2003); SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 116. Federal law requires the collection of SSNs for the 
administration of the federal personal income tax, Medicaid, Child Support Enforcement programs, and 
to ensure compliance with the USA Patriot Act. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOC. SEC. 
NUMBERS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS RESTRICT USE OF SSNS, YET GAPS REMAIN, GAO REP. NO. 
GAO-05-1016T, at 6, 9–10 & n.14, 11, 20–21 (Sept. 15, 2005) (statement of Barbara D. Bovbjerg, 
Director of Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051016t.pdf. See also 26 U.S.C. § 6109(a) (2000) (income tax); USA 
Patriot Act of 2001, 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(b)(3)(B) (Supp. II 2002); 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(13)(B) (West 
Supp. 2006) (child support); 42 U.S.C. § 1320b–7(a)(1), (b)(2) (2000) (Medicaid). Although federal law 
restricts the public disclosure of SSNs by credit reporting agencies, banks, and health care providers, no 
federal legislation addresses the collection and disclosure of SSNs by employers, retailers, and 
information resellers. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, My Social Security Number: How Secure Is It? 
(Jan. 2006), http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs10-ssn.htm; infra text accompanying notes 73–76. 
 24. FTC, INFORMATION COMPROMISE, supra note 2. 
 25. See Hearing Before the H. Energy Commerce Reps. and Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and 
Consumer Protection, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of H.R. Lively, President and CEO for the 
American Financial Services Association), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/ 
Hearings/05112006hearing1871/Lively.pdf [hereinafter Lively Testimony]. 
 26. Lively Testimony, supra note 25 (explaining that SSNs are used to track employees in high-
security positions); FREDERICK S. LANE III, THE NAKED EMPLOYEE: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS 
COMPROMISING WORKPLACE PRIVACY 28 (2003); Employees Sue over Data Theft, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
2006, at C2 (describing a class-action lawsuit filed by employees of the Union Pacific Corporation for 
the company’s use of SSNs to identify its employees). 
 27. Greg Sandoval, University Server in Hackers’ Hands for a Year, ZDNET NEWS, May 21, 
2006, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-6074739.html; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 
23. Although publicly funded schools governed by the Privacy Act of 1974 must tell students how their 
SSNs will be used, private institutes face few restrictions in their use of student and alumni SSNs. 
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 23. 
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often store SSNs and other personal data on behalf of businesses.28 
An entire industry has emerged—data brokerage—that sells SSNs of 
millions of individuals.29 Information brokers gather SSNs from public and 
private sources without individuals’ knowledge or consent.30 Moreover, 
data brokers typically refuse individual requests to remove personal 
information from their databases.31 
B.  BIOMETRIC DATA 
Images of the human body’s characteristics—a fingerprint, iris, retina, 
voice, and face—will increasingly be stored in databases to identify 
individuals and authenticate transactions.32 Some predict that soon “no one 
will need pockets” to store credit cards or keys because “[w]hen you need 
 
 28. Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The New Law of Information Security: What Companies Need to Do 
Now, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Nov. 2005, at 9, 16. See also GAO, MORE COULD BE DONE, 
supra note 21, at 3–4 (explaining that 90% of businesses outsource the storage of personal data, such as 
SSNs, to third-party contractors). 
 29. See SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 19; Jonathan Krim, Net Aids Access to Sensitive ID Data, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2005, at A1 (describing numerous companies that sell SSNs for as low as thirty-
five dollars on websites such as www.secret-info.com). One such firm, “SixChannels,” explains that it 
continuously gathers the personal data of consumers from a variety of sources, including title 
companies, credit bureaus, tax liens, and judgments. SixChannels, Next Generation Multichannel 
Marketing Solutions, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.sixchannels.net/faq.asp (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2006). 
 30. See SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 81, 84 (explaining that “[i]nformation collection is duplicitous, 
clandestine, and often coerced”); Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Bob Sherwood, Companies Selling 
Personal Information Have Been Allowed to Operate Relatively Free of Regulation, FIN. TIMES (U.K.), 
May 20, 2005, at 17 (discussing how data brokers acquire individuals’ names and addresses from credit 
agencies and supplement that information with data culled from public records); McClurg, supra note 7, 
at 65; Leigh Webb, Personal Information—Asset or Risk?, IDENTITY THEFT 911 NEWSLETTER, Apr. 
2006, at 1, available at http://www.identitytheft911-sunj.com/content.do?sp=323 (explaining that 
because of the increase in instances of personal data collection, often without the consumer’s consent, 
more and more people are falling victim to identity theft).  
 31. E.g., Kirchgaessner & Sherwood, supra note 30, at 17 (noting that LexisNexis permits 
consumers to opt out of its database only in limited circumstances, despite the industry’s previous 
commitment to permit such opt outs whenever a consumer requested them); Your Privacy for Sale, 
CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2006, available at http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/personal-finance/data-
privacy-10-06/a-steady-customer/1006_privacy_ov6_1.htm [hereinafter Your Privacy] (noting that the 
Pentagon refuses requests to opt out of its vast database). See also O’HARROW, supra note 12, at 138 
(explaining that information broker ChoicePoint apparently does not allow individuals to opt out of its 
databases). When Consumer Reports investigators asked data brokers to permit them access to their 
own personal information, the data brokers informed them that they could not see everything that was 
routinely sold to businesses. Your Privacy, supra. 
 32. See Gang Wei & Dongge Li, Biometrics: Applications, Challenges and the Future, in 
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 135, 136 
(Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Alex Halperin, Biometrics: Payments at 
Your Fingerprints, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Mar. 28, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ 
content/mar2006/tc20060328_901806.htm?campaign_id=search.  
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to open a door or make a purchase, chances are you’ll do it with a 
fingerprint, a voice command, or a computer scan of your eyeball.”33 
 Databases store an image of an individual’s biometric information, 
such as a picture of a person’s thumbprint or a mathematical formula of 
that image, called a template.34 The biometric system operates by matching 
an individual’s fingerprint, for example, with the image or template stored 
in the database.35 Computer databases today store a considerable amount of 
biometric data.36 A biometric provider, Pay By Touch, holds the biometric 
templates of over two million individuals who use their fingerprints to pay 
for gas and groceries.37 Elementary schools,38 airports,39 health clubs,40 
workplaces,41 and even Disney’s theme parks collect iris scans and 
 
 33. Halperin, supra note 32. 
 34. See Ishwar K. Sethi, Biometrics: Overview and Application, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES 
OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION, supra note 32, at 117, 120–22. In certain 
biometric systems, individuals do not provide their biometric information for storage in a database but 
instead carry cards, known as Smart Cards, with their biometric data stored inside. Id. at 121. Such 
systems match biometric data contained in a card to the individual’s characteristic, such as a fingerprint 
or iris. Id. See also Kevin Coughlin, Security in the Blink of an Eye, STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 4, 2006, at 43 
(describing the use of Smart Cards at airports). 
 35. Wei & Li, supra note 32, at 137 (explaining that biometric systems either identify an 
individual by matching the person’s sample to the many samples in the database or verify an 
individual’s identity by matching the sample to the template or image in the database with that name). 
 36. See JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR., NICHOLAS M. ORLANS & PETER T. HIGGINS, BIOMETRICS 
329–52 (2003); Roger Allan, Biometrics Wields a Double-Edged Sword, ELECTRONIC DESIGN, June 30, 
2005, at 77, available at http://www.elecdesign.com/Articles/ArticleID/10605/10605.html (describing 
massive databases of biometric data maintained by banking, security, and medical organizations). 
Technology sold by Identix Incorporated currently allows businesses to store up to twenty million 
fingerprints in a single computer database. See IDENTIX, ABIS® SYSTEM FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS—VERSION 4.1, para. 12 (2005), available at http://www.identix.com/support/ 
downloads/ABIS%204-1%20FAQs%20Draft2_Customer%20Version_Final.pdf. Comnetix Inc. stores 
biometric image scans indefinitely and, for government users, can submit scans to the national 
fingerprint database for quick checks against criminal records. John Breeden II, Biometrics Look Ready 
for Prime Time, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS, Feb. 6, 2006, at 36, available at 2006 WLNR 2849844.  
 37. Halperin, supra note 32. One hundred seventy-six Bi-Lo grocery stores in Georgia, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee use fingerprint systems to allow customers to cash paychecks. 
O’HARROW, supra note 12, at 174–75. 
 38. Halperin, supra note 32; Greg Toppo, Eye Scans: A High-Tech Hall Pass?, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 23, 2006, at 12B (discussing the recent implementation of iris-scan technology as a security 
measure at a New Jersey elementary school). 
 39. Coughlin, supra note 34; Elizabeth Fernandez, Fast-track Security Check OK’d for Airports, 
S.F. CHRON., Apr. 21, 2006, at B3 (discussing the Transportation Security Administration’s recent 
approval of a plan to use fingerprint and iris scans to screen preregistered passengers at airport security 
checkpoints at twenty airports). 
 40. Michael Sisk, Biometric Systems Replace the Lost Card Key, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., May 1, 
2006, at 17. 
 41. Joan Engebretson, How Security Dealers Really Feel About Biometrics, SEC. DISTRIBUTING 
& MARKETING., Mar. 13, 2006, available at http://www.sdmmag.com/copyright/faf86047124f9010 
VgnVCM100000f932a8c0_?. One in four companies surveyed by Deloitte in 2006 plans to employ 
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fingerprints of individuals to secure access to their physical plants.42 
Businesses allow customers to pay by scanning their fingerprints.43 
Companies, like Morpheus Technologies and ChoicePoint, plan to create 
“central clearinghouses” of biometric information for commercial use.44 As 
the use of biometric systems spreads, the amount of biometric information 
stored in databases will increase exponentially.45 
C.  THE RISKS OF STORING PERSONAL IDENTIFYING INFORMATION IN 
DATABASES 
Databases filled with large caches of personal information are prime 
targets of cyber-criminals.46 The Internet provides hackers access to an 
organization’s databases of personal information.47 More than 75% of 
companies surveyed by Deloitte in the first half of 2006 reported that they 
had suffered a data-security breach from outside intruders, up from 26% in 
2005.48 Furthermore, employees were responsible for 50% of all data leaks 
reported.49 
 
biometric security measures over the next eighteen months to authenticate employees. DELOITTE, 2006 
GLOBAL SECURITY STUDY 9 (2006), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/ 
dtt_lssecuritystudy_053006.pdf. 
 42. David Wyld, Biometrics at the Disney Gates, SECUREID NEWS, Mar. 2, 2006, 
http://www.secureidnews.com/library/2006/03/02/biometrics-at-the-disney-gates/. 
 43. Brian J. Rogal, Biometrics: Getting in Touch with a Growing Trend, CREDIT CARD MGMT., 
Feb. 1, 2006, at 26. Credit unions have “started deploying electronic fingerprint systems at kiosks to 
allow members to do business remotely.” O’HARROW, supra note 12, at 176. See Jonathan Curiel, The 
Last Days of Privacy, S.F. CHRON., June 25, 2006, at E1 (discussing the present consideration by the 
banking industry of widespread implementation of biometric technology in ATMs in the United States). 
 44. O’HARROW, supra note 12, at 171; C. Maxine Most, Biometrics and Financial Services—
Show Me the Money!, DIGITAL ID WORLD, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 20, available at http://magazine.digital 
idworld.com/Jan04/Page20.pdf. 
 45. See Dan Frommer, The Tell-Tale Heart, FORBES.COM, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.forbes.com 
/technology/2006/02/16/ibm-aladdin-biometric-cx_df_0216biometric.html (predicting that the annual 
sales of biometric security devices will grow from its present level of $2.2 billion to $6 billion by 
2010). See also William Abernathy & Lee Tien, Biometrics: Who’s Watching You?, http://www.eff.org/ 
Privacy/Surveillance/biometrics/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2006) (stating that an effective biometric system 
“must compare captured biometric data to a biometric database”). 
 46. See Jarrett Banks, Identity Theft Suits Gain Popularity with Plaintiffs, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, 
July 2005, at 32. 
 47. Michael E. Whitman, Enemy at the Gate: Threats to Information Security, COMM. OF THE 
ACM, Aug. 2003, at 91, 92–93 (explaining different means by which the Internet opens organizations 
using it to attack of their computer networks). See also Siobhan Gorman, Hacker Attacks Hitting 
Pentagon, BALTIMORE SUN, July 2, 2006, at 1A (describing thousands of successful penetrations of the 
Pentagon’s computer networks and noting the obsolescence of NSA’s methods to safeguard data). 
 48. Dean Foust, ID Theft: More Hype Than Harm, BUS. WK., July 3, 2006, at 34. 
 49. DELOITTE, PROTECTING THE DIGITAL ASSETS: THE 2006 TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECURITY SURVEY 7 (2006), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/ 
content/dtt_DR_ProtectingDigitalAssets_062106.pdf. 
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Consider a sample of the data-security breaches from January 2005 to 
July 2006. Computer hackers accessed the databases of forty-five colleges 
and universities, resulting in the release of 1.8 million students’ SSNs.50 
Thieves obtained the SSNs and credit card information of over 41 million 
customers.51 Dishonest employees accessed personal data of 1.7 million 
coworkers and clients.52 
The public sector has had its share of information leaks as well. In 
May 2006, a Veterans Administration employee downloaded the SSNs of 
as many as 26.5 million veterans onto a laptop, which was stolen from the 
employee’s home.53 In all, nearly one out of every four households in the 
United States has been the victim of identity theft.54 
1.  The Hazards of Escaping SSNs 
Identity theft is a glaring consequence of the release of SSNs from 
today’s cyber-reservoirs.55 An SSN, along with a person’s name and birth 
date, authenticates an individual in the marketplace.56 With that 
information, a thief obtains “virtual keys” to a victim’s finances.57 An 
identity thief can empty bank accounts, obtain credit cards, secure loans, 
open lines of credit, connect telephone services, and enroll in government 
benefits in a victim’s name.58 Identity thieves also commit crimes in their 
 
 50. See Privacy Rights, Chronology, supra note 9. See also Stefanie Olsen, Man Charged with 
Hacking USC Database, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 20, 2006, http://news.com.com/Man+charged+with+ 
hacking+USC+database/2100-7350_3-6063470.html?tag=nl (describing a hacker’s successful 
penetration of a USC database containing 275,000 applicants’ SSNs). “Universities are becoming 
bigger and bigger targets to the hacker community because they are large institutions” with vast 
collections of SSNs. Id. 
 51. See Privacy Rights, Chronology, supra note 9 (describing data-security breaches at 
Guess.com and DSW Inc., among others). 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Stout, supra note 10. 
 54. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 3, 13 (Sept. 2003), 
available at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/pdf/synovatereport.pdf. See also Christine Dugas, 
Federal Survey: Identity Theft Hits 1 in 4 U.S. Households, USA TODAY, Sept. 4, 2003, at 10B. 
 55. See Barbara Kiviat, Who’s Got Your Number?, TIME, July 17, 2006, at 68 (explaining that 
“[t]he quickest way to become a victim of identity theft is to let your [SSN] fall into the wrong hands”). 
 56. See Swire, supra note 10, at 290. 
 57. O’HARROW, supra note 12, at 79; Swire, supra note 10, at 290. 
 58. Leland & Zeller, supra note 2; Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 23. See also Harry 
A. Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound Internet Safety Policies, 2004 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶ 15 (2004), available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/ 
04_STLR_2/contents_f.htm (noting that identity theft is an “enabling crime” that permits criminals to 
commit other crimes by assuming the victim’s identity). This past year, identity thieves used the SSNs 
and birth dates of three million people to “open new lines of credit, secure loans, [and] flip property” in 
the victim’s name. See Leland & Zeller, supra note 2. 
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victims’ names.59 A victim of criminal impersonation risks arrest and a 
criminal record for an identity thief’s transgressions.60 
Identity-theft victims suffer significant emotional and financial 
harm.61 Victims devote an average of $1000 in out-of-pocket expenses and 
over 600 hours of personal time to clean up their credit reports.62 When lost 
income is included, the average victim loses $16,971.63 
The release of sensitive personal information can also be deadly. 
Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.64 involved an information broker that sold a 
woman’s SSN and employment information to a stalker who used it to find 
the woman and kill her.65 Although Remsburg did not involve a computer-
security breach, it illustrates the risk of physical harm that can result from 
the escape of sensitive personal data.66 
2.  The Impending Dangers of Released Biometric Data 
The release of biometric information from a database will engender 
serious harm as criminals can use such data to impersonate individuals.67 
 
 59. See Valetk, supra note 58, ¶¶ 31–32. 
 60. See BOB SULLIVAN, YOUR EVIL TWIN: BEHIND THE IDENTITY THEFT EPIDEMIC 42 (2004) 
(describing examples of victims of criminal identity theft who faced arrest and jail time before clearing 
their names). A false criminal record is virtually impossible to erase because officials of criminal 
records databases are reluctant to remove information from such databases. Id. 
 61. Data Breaches and Identity Theft: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (prepared statement of Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of the 
FTC), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/ftc.pdf [hereinafter Majoras Statement] (“Identity 
theft causes significant economic and emotional injury.”); O’HARROW, supra note 12, at 78; Identity 
Theft Resolution Center, Rutgers University, Identity Theft Overview: Part III—Emotional 
Considerations, 2003, available at http://www.identitytheft911-sunj.com/articles/article.ext?sp=27. 
 62. Prieto, supra note 16. 
 63. Heather M. Howard, Note, The Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud: A Common-sense 
Common Law Claim, 54 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1268 (2005). Victims also risk losing stolen bank funds in 
excess of the FDIC’s insurance limit as the FDIC only insures up to $100,000 of a bank customer’s 
funds. See Federal Deposit Insurance Co., FDIC: Insuring Your Deposits, http://www.fdic.gov (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2006). 
 64. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005–06 (N.H. 2003). 
 65. Id. at 1006–08 (finding an information broker liable for the stalker’s criminal actions because 
the information broker’s conduct created “‘an especial temptation and opportunity for criminal 
misconduct’” (quoting Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106 (N.H. 1993))). 
 66. See also Your Privacy, supra note 31 (citing a lawsuit alleging that a former coworker of 
Stanford Douglas obtained his home address from a data broker and later killed him). 
 67. See Bruce Barton et al., The Emerging Cyber Risks of Biometrics, RISK MGMT. MAG., Oct. 
2005, at 26, 28, available at http://www.rmmag.com/ShowArticle.cfm?AID=2896; Frommer, supra 
note 45 (explaining that “any biometric database runs the risk of being hacked” to steal the information 
inside). The 2006 Biometrics and Privacy report, issued by the world’s largest biometrics consulting 
group, warns that the storage of biometric information in databases runs a “high” degree of risk of theft 
to gain unauthorized access to a biometric system. Int’l Biometric Group, Biometric Research Report 
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Cyber-criminals can reverse engineer biometric templates into images in 
order to create replicas, such as a gelatin copy of a person’s thumbprint or a 
contact lens of the person’s iris.68 That prosthetic device can fool, or 
“spoof,” a biometric scanner.69 
With the replica, a thief gains access to everything available to the 
victim, such as computer networks, workplace, and retail accounts. A 
cyber-criminal can commit corporate espionage and steal unpatented 
research and development.70 Identity theft can also be perpetrated.71 As 
 
Series, Biometrics and Privacy, 2006 Research Report Series 3–8 (unpublished report on file with 
author) [hereinafter Int’l Biometric]. 
 68. Sethi, supra note 34, at 131–32; Wei & Li, supra note 32, at 143. Although many biometric 
vendors would have the public believe that reverse engineering is not possible, that is simply untrue. 
Sethi, supra note 34, at 131–32. For example, in 2002, an Australian computer science student reverse 
engineered a fingerprint system as part of his honors thesis. Id. Moreover, a 2003 study showed that 
sample images can be regenerated from face recognition templates. ANDY ADLER, SAMPLE IMAGES 
CAN BE INDEPENDENTLY RESTORED FROM FACE RECOGNITION TEMPLATES (2003), available at 
http://www.site.uottawa.ca/~adler/publications/2003/adler-2003-fr-templates.pdf. See also Int’l 
Biometric, supra note 67, at 35 (discussing regeneration of face recognition templates). 
 69. See Tom Sanders, Biometrics Struggles to Go Mainstream, COMPUTING UK, Feb. 17, 2006, 
available at http://www.computing.co.uk/vnunet/news/2150496/biometrics-struggle-mainstream; Sethi, 
supra note 34, at 131. Prosthetic fingerprint samples can trick nearly all biometric scanners except high-
end models employing thermal sensors. See id. at 131–32. These sensors ensure that the sample comes 
from a live human being. Id. Thermal-sensing machines, however, are not fool-proof as its “liveness” 
testing system can be breached and shut down. See TechTarget Expert Answer Center, Expert 
Knowledgebase, Joel Dubin, Penetrating a Biometric Security System, Sept. 21, 2005, 
http://expertanswercenter.techtarget.com/eac/knowledgebaseAnswer/0,295199,sid63_gci1142719,00.ht
ml. The significant cost of thermal-sensor scanners also suggests that such machines will not be 
employed when biometric systems are implemented on a grand scale. See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. 
CTR., COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, BEFORE THE DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, IN THE MATTER OF FACT ACT BIOMETRIC STUDY, FILE NO. R41105 (Apr. 1, 2004) 
(submitted by Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Associate Director & W. Neal Hartzog, IPIOP Clerk), available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/biometrics/factabiometrics.html. 
 70. See DELOITTE, supra note 41, at 9. 
 71. A thief’s use of an individual’s biometric data to commit identity theft will create enormous 
problems for victims seeking to prove the theft, as all identity-theft victims face a certain amount of 
difficulty in proving that fraudulent expenses are not their own. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Human 
Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 89, 107 (2001). But the likely 
assumption that one’s fingerprint does not lie compounds that difficulty for an individual who suffers 
financial theft as a result of the leak of the individual’s biometric. See Duncan Graham-Rowe, Privacy 
and Prejudice: Whose ID Is It Anyway?, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 17, 2005, at 20. Moreover, an 
individual’s retina scan provides insight into certain medical conditions, such as high blood pressure 
and AIDS, placing an individual at risk for discrimination by employers. Sethi, supra note 34, at 125. 
The image of a fingerprint, if restored from the template, could reveal that an individual suffers from 
certain genetic disorders. DAVIDE MALTONI ET AL., HANDBOOK OF FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION 46 
(2003). The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000), would prohibit 
any discrimination on the basis of an employee’s medical disability. ADA, however, defines disabilities 
so narrowly that many serious health conditions are not covered by its protections, perhaps including 
high blood pressure. See id. § 12102(2) (defining disability as a condition that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999) (stating 
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Bruce Schneier notes, once someone steals the biometric image of your 
thumb, “it remains stolen for life; there’s no getting it back.”72 
The amount of personal identifying information stored in databases 
maintained by the private sector is astounding. Once cyber-data escapes 
into the hands of hackers and dishonest employees, individuals and 
businesses suffer significant harm. This extreme risk cries out for a 
solution, and the next part explores whether public law can provide it. 
III.  THE FEASIBILITY OF A PUBLIC LAW SOLUTION FOR 
INSECURE CYBER-RESERVOIRS 
To date, the private sector’s collection of sensitive personal 
information remains largely unregulated by federal law. While federal 
legislation governs the security of personal data stored by federal 
agencies,73 similar federal restrictions apply only to a narrow set of private 
entities, such as financial institutions,74 credit agencies,75 and health care 
providers.76 
 
that because a terminated employee’s life activities suffered no substantial limits when the employee 
took medication for high blood pressure, the employee was not “disabled” within the meaning of ADA 
because under ADA, disability is properly assessed in light of any mitigating measures employed). 
 72. BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 144 
(2000). As biometric technology develops universal biometric templates capable of recognition in any 
system, a thief will be able to use a victim’s biometric data to access any database on which the victim’s 
template resides. See Int’l Biometric, supra note 67, at 1. 
 73. See Federal Information Security Management Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 
2003) (requiring security measures to protect information collected and maintained by federal agencies 
and all information systems used or operated by or for federal agencies). The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000), also regulates the collection and use of records by federal agencies, giving 
individuals the right to access and correct information in such records. 
 74. See Title V of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (2000), 
which prohibits financial institutions from disclosing a consumer’s personal information to an 
unaffiliated third party without giving the consumer the opportunity to opt out of the disclosure. See 
also 65 Fed. Reg. 33,646 (May 24, 2000) (promulgated pursuant to the GLBA). GLBA also requires 
financial institutions to implement “appropriate” physical, technical, and procedural safeguards to 
protect customer information. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b). The FTC has set forth standards governing the 
safeguarding of consumer information stored digitally. See Standards for Safeguarding Customer 
Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.1–.5 (2006). See also 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484 (May 23, 2002) (discussing 
standards for safeguarding information). 
 75. See The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACT Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 
1681g(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 2003), which includes a number of provisions designed to increase the 
protection of sensitive consumer information, including SSNs.  
 76. See Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 
1320d-2 (2000). See also 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2005) (prescribing security and privacy regulations 
pursuant to HIPAA). 
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In response to the recent escalation of data-security breaches in the 
private sector, the FTC has broadened its enforcement authority over unfair 
trade practices to include any private entity’s failure to provide 
“appropriate” information security.77 To that end, the FTC has reached a 
number of consent decrees with companies whose information-security 
lapses led to the release of personal data.78 The FTC also recently 
established a Division of Privacy and Identity Protection to enhance 
consumer outreach and enforcement.79 Notwithstanding these encouraging 
developments, the FTC has limited resources to devote to the problem of 
leaking personal cyber-data.80 Of the hundreds of documented data-security 
breaches from February 2005 through September 2006,81 the FTC could 
apparently pursue only six.82 
Some states have stepped in to fill the gaps in enforcement. California 
stands at the vanguard of this trend. Under California law, companies must 
employ “reasonable” information-security measures to protect sensitive 
consumer data83 and must notify consumers if their personal information is 
 
 77. E.g., FTC Complaint, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., Case No. 042 3160 (2005), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/0423160.htm. See also News Release, U.S. Federal Trade 
Comm’n, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges (Jan. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.htm [hereinafter FTC ChoicePoint]. 
 78. See, e.g., FTC ChoicePoint, supra note 77 (requiring ChoicePoint to establish a 
comprehensive information security program designed to protect sensitive personal information it 
collects about consumers and to audit its security practices every two years). 
 79. Social Security Numbers in Commerce: Reconciling Beneficial Uses with Threats to Privacy: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r of the U.S. Federal 
Trade Comm’n) [hereinafter Leibowitz Statement]. 
 80. SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 73. 
 81. See Privacy Rights, Chronology, supra note 9. 
 82. See News Release, U.S. Federal Trade Comm’n, Real Estate Services Company Settles 
Privacy and Security Charge (May 10, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/05/ 
nationstitle.htm; News Release, U.S. Federal Trade Comm’n, CardSystems Solutions Settles FTC 
Charges (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/02/cardsystems_r.htm; News 
Release, U.S. Federal Trade Comm’n, DSW Inc. Settles FTC Charges (Dec. 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/12/dsw.htm; News Release, U.S. Federal Trade Comm’n, Mortgage 
Company Settles Information Security Charges (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 
2005/09/Superior.htm; supra text accompanying notes 77–78 (discussing the FTC’s settlement with 
ChoicePoint and BJ’s Wholesale Club). See also Leibowitz Statement, supra note 79, at 15 (explaining 
that since 2001 the FTC has brought thirteen cases challenging businesses that failed to take reasonable 
steps to protect sensitive consumer information). 
 83. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2006). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104(b) 
(Supp. 2005) (requiring reasonable measures to protect sensitive consumer data); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
49.2-2(2), (3) (Supp. 2005) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.970(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) 
(requiring businesses to encrypt electronic transmissions that contain consumers’ personal information 
when those transmissions are sent outside the firm). 
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leaked.84 Following California’s lead, twenty-two states now have some 
sort of consumer-notification rules.85 In twenty-five states, consumers may 
freeze their credit reports.86 A smaller number of states limit the display or 
retention of consumer SSNs on access cards and mailings.87 
As the recent data-security breaches attest, the patchwork of state and 
federal laws has not effectively addressed database security. Some 
members of Congress agree that the insecure database problem requires a 
public law solution.88 In the past year, members of the House and Senate 
 
 84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West Supp. 2006). 
 85. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b (West 
Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-102 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912 (Supp. 2006); 815 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/10 (West Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-1-11-5 (LexisNexis Supp. 
2005) (applying only to state agencies); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074 (Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 1348 (Supp. 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61 (West Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2005) (effective Mar. 1, 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 (LexisNexis 
Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West Supp. 2006); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa 
(McKinney Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (Supp. 2005); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.12, 1349.19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
2303 (West Supp. 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-3 (Supp. 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 
(Supp. 2005); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.103 (Vernon Supp. 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 19.255.010 (West Supp. 2006). 
 86. Those states allow consumers to freely freeze their credit reports without any preconditions 
except Illinois, Kansas, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Washington, which only permit identity-
theft victims to freeze their credit reports. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.11.2 (West Supp. 2006); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-14.3-106.6 (West Supp. 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701a (West Supp. 
2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2203 (2006); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2MM (West Supp. 
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3571.1M (Supp. 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1313-C (Supp. 
2005); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598C.300 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:11-46 (West 
Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-63 (2005); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 20.034 (Vernon Supp. 
2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2480h (Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.170 (West Supp. 
2006); 75 Del. Laws Ch. 328 (2006); 2006 Fla. Laws Ch. 2006–124, 1 (effective July 1, 2006) (to be 
codified at FLA. STAT. § 501.005); 2006 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 138 (LexisNexis) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2007); Act of Apr. 19, 2006, 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 149 § 12 (effective Jan. 1, 
2007); 2006 Ky. Acts Ch. 42, § 3 (to be codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367); 2006 Minn. Laws Ch. 
233 (effective Aug. 1, 2006); 2006 N.H. Laws Ch. 208 (effective Jan. 1, 2007); Act of June 7, 2006, 
2006 N.Y. Laws 63 (effective Nov. 1, 2006); Oklahoma Consumer Report Security Freeze Act, 2006 
Okla. Sess. Laws Ch. 283 (effective Jan. 1, 2007) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, § 149); 
Consumer Empowerment and Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2006, 2006 R.I. Pub. Laws 568 
(effective Jan. 1, 2007) (to be codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-48-5); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 
2006 Utah Laws Ch. 344 (effective Sept. 1, 2008) (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-42-201); 
2005 Wis. Sess. Laws 140 (effective Jan. 1, 2007) (to be codified at WIS. STAT. § 100.54(2)); S.B. 180, 
81st Leg. (S.D. 2006). 
 87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-86-107 (Supp. 2005) (effective Jan. 1, 2007); MD. CODE ANN., COM. 
LAW § 14-3402 (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.59 (West Supp. 2006); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 30-14-1722 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-62 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1349.17 
(LexisNexis 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-443.2 (Supp. 2005). 
 88. See S. 1332, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005) (describing databases of personal information as prime 
targets of hackers, identity thieves, rogue employees, and other criminals, who misuse such data and 
cause “serious or irreparable harm to an individual’s livelihood” and hurt businesses). 
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have proposed a flurry of legislation. Some proposals are modest, only 
seeking to regulate the sale of SSNs by information brokers.89 Other 
proposals go further in regulating the private sector’s digital reservoirs of 
personal identifying information. 
Senator Charles Schumer’s proposed Comprehensive Identity Theft 
Protection Act, for example, would establish an Office of Identity Theft in 
the FTC charged with protecting sensitive personal information collected 
by businesses.90 Under the Schumer proposal, the FTC would promulgate 
regulations regarding the information-security practices of commercial 
entities.91 The proposal would require covered entities to provide notice of 
data-security breaches, give consumers greater control over the use of their 
sensitive personal information, and limit the display of SSNs.92 The 
Schumer proposal accords with the views of noted privacy experts.93 
If the Schumer proposal or another like it becomes law, the FTC 
would likely follow the standards it has set for the financial services 
industry’s storage of customer information under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act (“GLBA Safeguards Rule”).94 In recent testimony before a House 
subcommittee, the FTC’s Chairman urged Congress to extend its GLBA 
 
 89. E.g., Information Protection and Security Act, S. 500, 109th Cong. §§ 2(b), 3(a)(2) (2005) 
(directing the FTC to promulgate regulations governing the conduct of information brokers and the 
protection of data held by such brokers without preempting any state law that would provide greater 
consumer protection); Privacy Act of 2005, S. 116, 109th Cong. § 101 (2005) (rendering it unlawful for 
commercial entities to sell personal identifying information without the individual’s notice and 
opportunity to restrict disclosure); Social Security On-line Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 82, 109th Cong. 
§ 2 (2005) (preventing interactive computer services from disclosing SSNs or other personally 
identifiable information without consent). See also Anne Broache, Congress May Slap Restrictions on 
SSN Use, CNET NEWS.COM, May 12, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-7348_3-6071441.html (noting 
that at least three pieces of pending legislation in the House and Senate would restrict the use and sale 
of SSNs). 
 90. S. 768, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005). 
 91. Id. §§ 3, 5 (ordering the FTC to promulgate regulations governing the sale, maintenance, 
collection, or transfer of sensitive personal information, including a requirement that all commercial 
entities take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive personal information they 
collect, sell, or transfer). Legislation proposed by Senators Specter, Leahy, and Feingold similarly 
would require all businesses storing personally identifiable data of over 10,000 individuals to 
implement a comprehensive data privacy security program. S. 1332, 109th Cong. §§ 401(b), 402 
(2005). 
 92. S. 768, § 3. 
 93. See SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 104–05; Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model 
Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 368–79. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, 
Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497 
(1995). The Schumer proposal brings together many of the state-level innovations discussed in notes 
83–87, supra. 
 94. Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. pt. 314 (2006). 
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Safeguards Rule to all private entities storing personal information.95 The 
GLBA Safeguards Rule requires financial institutions to design 
comprehensive information-security programs suited to the consumer data 
they store.96 The FTC gives financial institutions the responsibility and 
discretion to develop and update their security systems to meet today’s 
rapidly changing risk environment.97 
Although a comprehensive public law solution like the Schumer bill 
would contribute much to addressing the bursting cyber-reservoirs of the 
Information Age, such legislation is unlikely to pass. In November 2005, 
partisan disagreement killed a bill that would have required information 
brokers to notify consumers about data-security breaches where the broker 
determined that a breach raised a “significant risk” of identity theft.98 Many 
Democrats refused to support a similar bill because it would have “watered 
down” current state consumer-notification rules by allowing the broker to 
decide whether a breach warranted disclosure and because it failed to offer 
consumers the right to access and correct their personal information held by 
information brokers.99 
Strong interest-group opposition to comprehensive data-security 
legislation also might preclude a public law solution. As conceived by 
public choice theory, Congress is a marketplace where legislation is “sold” 
by lawmakers and “bought” by beneficiaries of such legislation.100 
Lawmakers provide legislative benefits to groups when it “best serves their 
 
 95. Leibowitz Statement, supra note 79, at 10 n.25. 
 96. 16 C.F.R. § 314.3. 
 97. See U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE FTC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
ONLINE ACCESS AND SECURITY § 3.5 (May 15, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/acoas/ 
papers/finalreport.htm; Smedinghoff, supra note 28, at 9, 13 (explaining that the FTC and technologists 
alike agree that information security is a process, not a product, and thus it does not, and cannot, 
literally dictate what security measures are required); News Release, U.S. Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC 
Testifies on Security Issues in Global Information-based Economy (Mar. 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/03/globalitsecurity.htm. 
 98. Identity Theft Resolution Center, Rutgers University, House Commerce Passes ‘Partisan’ 
Bill, but Bachus Seeks Consensus, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.identitytheft911-sunj.com/ 
articles/article.ext?sp=74 (discussing H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (2005)). That bill received support by the 
information brokerage industry, which argued that consumers would not want to be bombarded with 
notices every time a breach occurred. Id. 
 99. See David Lazarus, Data Theft Bill a Step Backward, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 6, 2005, at J1 
(discussing H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2005)). 
 100. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-group 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975). See also Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case 
Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 400 (1992). 
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goals, including their primary objective of being re-elected.”101 Members 
of the larger public, however, tend not to organize and present their 
demands to lawmakers because they are plagued by free-rider problems—
each member knows that an individual contribution will have an 
imperceptible impact on the group’s activity and thus will be inclined to let 
others make a contribution instead.102 The efforts of well-organized groups 
usually prevail over the interests of the larger public because those groups 
often succeed in distancing the legislator’s self-interest from those of the 
public.103 
Interest groups may indeed succeed in convincing lawmakers that 
data-security legislation would undermine their reelection efforts. In May 
2006, lobbyists representing the financial services industry, pension 
planners, and others voiced their opposition to bills limiting the storage of 
SSNs.104 Business groups argued that SSNs are critical to financial 
transactions and “internal security operations,” such as employee 
background checks.105 
Congress also has an interest in the collection of personal information, 
as its members use databases containing voters’ personal data in 
 
 101. Stearns, supra note 100, at 400. See also ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC 
CONSTITUTION 67 (2000) (explaining that politicians in a democracy are concerned with the number of 
votes lobbyists can deliver). 
 102. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 64 (1965); Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 63, 87 (1990); Stearns, supra note 100, at 401. 
 103. Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Foreword: Post-Public Choice?, 87 CORNELL L. 
REV. 267, 268 (2002); Saul Levmore, From Cynicism to Positive Theory in Public Choice, 87 CORNELL 
L. REV. 375 , 375 (2002). 
 104. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 2, 11–13 (2006) (prepared statement of Oliver Ireland 
on behalf of the Financial Services Coordinating Council), available at http://energy 
commerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/05112006hearing1871/Ireland.pdf [hereinafter Ireland Statement]; 
Lively Testimony, supra note 25; Social Security Numbers in Commerce: Reconciling Beneficial Uses 
with Threats to Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection 
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 5 (2006) (prepared statement of Susan 
McDonald, President of Pension Benefit Information), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/ 
108/Hearings/05112006hearing1871/McDonald.pdf; Social Security Numbers in Commerce: 
Reconciling Beneficial Uses with Threats to Privacy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(prepared statement of Lauren B. Steinfeld, Chief Privacy Officer of the University of Pennsylvania), 
available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/108/Hearings/05112006hearing1871/Steinfeld.pdf. Cf. 
Leland & Zeller, supra note 2 (describing strong business opposition to proposed state laws permitting 
consumers to freeze their credit reports that led to the defeat of proposed legislation in many states). 
 105. E.g., Ireland Statement, supra note 104, at 11. 
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campaigns.106 For example, data broker Aristotle International sold voter 
information to nearly half of the 535 members of Congress in recent 
years.107 Because reelection campaigns depend on databases of personal 
information to court voters, lawmakers may be less inclined to support 
legislation that would curtail such data collection.108 As a result, a public 
solution, although beneficial, may be unlikely in the near future. 
To be sure, even in the absence of comprehensive legislation, victims 
of data-security breaches can sue for negligence. The following part, 
however, explains why that, too, constitutes an inadequate response to the 
dangers posed by the insecure cyber-reservoirs of personal data. 
IV.  NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY AS A POTENTIAL RESPONSE TO 
THE RELEASE OF SENSITIVE DATA 
Several commentators propose a negligence solution for today’s 
insecure databases.109 Victims of recent data-security breaches are 
currently pursuing negligence cases against database operators. Those 
lawsuits allege that database operators failed to reasonably secure sensitive 
personal information in violation of state statutory law and common law 
principles.110 
Cases such as Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. 
support the notion that database operators have a duty to safeguard 
sensitive data from intruders.111 In Kline, a criminal assaulted the plaintiff 
 
 106. Prieto, supra note 16, at 18. Indeed, the Republican National Committee maintains a Voter 
Vault database, which allows party activists to track and solicit voters. Peter Wallsten & Tom 
Hamburger, The GOP Knows You Don’t Like Anchovies, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2006, at M1. 
 107. Prieto, supra note 16, at 18. 
 108. Members of Congress could exempt themselves from any restrictions on the use of voters’ 
cyber-data. That possibility would not diminish the impact that strong interest-group opposition to a 
comprehensive legislative solution like the Schumer proposal would have on Members’ of Congress 
reluctance to pass such legislation given their self-interest in reelection. 
 109. E.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 
S.C. L. REV. 255, 311 (2005) (suggesting a negligence solution for the release of SSNs); Michael L. 
Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1553, 1557 (2005) (proposing a cause of action against software manufacturers whose software 
enables cyber-criminals to access information databases). 
 110. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Parke v. 
Cardsystems Solutions, Inc., No. CGC-05-442624 (Sup. Ct. Cal. July 5, 2005) (alleging that the 
defendant failed to adequately secure sensitive personal data of over 40 million California residents, 
thus allowing hackers to steal plaintiffs’ SSNs) (currently pending). See also supra note 85 and 
accompanying text (discussing states that require private entities to employ reasonable security 
measures over sensitive personal data). 
 111. Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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tenant in the plaintiff’s apartment building’s hallway.112 The court held that 
the defendant landlord had a duty to reasonably protect the plaintiff from a 
third party’s criminal acts because only the landlord had control over, and 
the ability to secure, the building’s common areas.113 
Indeed, plaintiffs have successfully argued for an extension of the 
Kline rule to employers whose collections of sensitive data have been 
stolen by third parties. In Bell v. Michigan Council 25 of the American 
Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 1023, for 
example, a labor union official brought home a list of union members’ 
SSNs.114 An identity thief somehow obtained the list from the official’s 
home.115 The court found that the labor union had a duty to protect its 
members’ sensitive personal data from a third party’s criminal acts given 
the fiduciary relationship between them and the foreseeability of identity 
theft.116 Thus, negligence lawsuits like Bell can operate on their own or as a 
companion to a public law solution.117 
When viewed from both an economic and moral perspective, however, 
it is clear that a negligence regime is inadequate to address the problem of 
hazardous information reservoirs. Jurists and scholars have long debated 
the goals of negligence—law-and-economics theorists conceptualize 
negligence under a cost-benefit analysis,118 whereas other scholars view 
negligence through a moral lens.119 In the discussion that follows, I 
demonstrate that both approaches converge to the conclusion that 
 
 112. Id. at 480. 
 113. Id. at 481, 483–84. 
 114. Bell v. Mich. Council 25 of the Am. Fed’n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, Local 1023, 
No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005). 
 115. Id. at *1. 
 116. Id. at *3–4. See also Johnson, supra note 109, at 273–34 (arguing for the extension of the 
Kline rule to database operators based on the fiduciary relationship between the operator and the 
operator’s customers). But see Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Developing U.S. Legal Standard for 
Cybersecurity, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 109, 115 (2003) (suggesting that foreseeability is the cornerstone of 
liability for database breaches). 
 117. If Congress adopts a comprehensive bill like the Schumer proposal and the FTC follows its 
current practices, tort regulation would complement the FTC’s performance-based standards, which tell 
entities what they must accomplish but leave them to decide what technology to use to satisfy the 
regulation at least cost. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tort Law in the Regulatory State, in TORT LAW 
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 80, 91, 95–96 
(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991). This analysis presumes that state law would not be preempted by federal 
legislation. The Schumer bill and other similar comprehensive proposals signal Congress’s intent not to 
preempt state laws, a view which is consistent with Congress’s vow to leave states free to act on data-
security issues in FACTA and GLBA. See Identity Theft Resolution Center, supra note 98. 
 118. E.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEG. STUD. 29, 32–34 (1972). 
 119. E.g., 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS 
131–32 (2d ed. 1986). 
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negligence is a suboptimal regime in addressing this important issue of 
legal policy. 
A.  THE UNCERTAINTY DILEMMA 
The rapidly changing nature of information technologies may create 
uncertainty as to what a negligence regime entails, blunting its efficiency 
from a law-and-economics perspective.120 Under the Judge Learned Hand 
formula, an actor is negligent if the marginal cost of avoiding an accident is 
less than the cost of the accident, given the likelihood of the accident’s 
occurrence.121 Negligence operates optimally when parties can anticipate 
the law’s requirements in a particular circumstance.122 
The negligence doctrine, however, may not operate optimally when a 
party is uncertain about the law’s requirements.123 In the face of uncertainty 
about how negligence will be applied due to rapidly developing 
technologies, actors may modify their behavior to a greater extent than 
required by law in order to decrease their chance of liability.124 Even if the 
result is economic waste, actors might adopt excessive, and perhaps 
 
 120. The question of whether a fault-based system or a strict-liability standard is most 
economically efficient has been long and carefully debated by prominent scholars and jurists. See, e.g., 
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 263, 312 (1970); 
RICHARD EPSTEIN, TORTS 91–107 (1999); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 177–92 
(6th ed. 2003); Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort 
Theory, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 27, 51–56 (1980) (comparing the theories of Calabresi and Posner). Although 
this Article does not endeavor to tackle that abstract question, that debate may be given greater meaning 
in light of this concrete policy application of efficiency considerations to today’s insecure database 
problem. 
 121. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (ruling that “if the 
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B, liability [in a negligence regime] depends upon 
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.”). For a contemporary invocation of the 
Hand Formula, see Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 936 n.3 (Wyo. 2000). Some reject an 
economic view of optimal deterrence, instead asking whether the social benefits gained by reducing the 
risk of injury outweigh the social costs incurred to reduce the risk. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS 
AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 15–16 (2d ed. 2002). 
 122. See ABRAHAM, supra note 121, at 16; STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 46–
47, 59 (2004) (explaining that when a due-care level is chosen by courts to equal the socially optimal 
level of care, the injurers will be led to exercise due care); Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with 
Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187, 1222 (2001). 
 123. See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 279, 279–80 (1986). 
 124. Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Errors and the Functioning of Tort Liability, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 165, 169, 186 (2005) (explaining how uncertainty in liability rules and damages often yield higher 
levels of precaution); Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An Economic 
Analysis of Legal Form, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 359 (1991). 
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inefficient, precautions in a negligence regime in order to bolster their 
claim to have exercised due care should litigation arise.125 
Due to the rapidly changing threats to information security, database 
operators will likely be uncertain as to what constitutes optimal care. 
Cyber-intruders employ increasingly innovative techniques to bypass 
security measures and steal personal data,126 thereby requiring an ever-
changing information-security response to new threats, vulnerabilities, and 
technologies.127 A database operator’s uncertainty about the contours of 
due care may prompt it to take too much precaution. Such overcompliance 
with the law risks inhibiting socially useful data collection.128  
B.  RESIDUAL RISK 
A negligence regime will fail to address the significant leaks that will 
occur despite database operators’ exercise of due care over personal data. 
Security breaches are an inevitable byproduct of collecting sensitive 
 
 125. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 123, at 299; Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic 
Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 809–12 (1983). 
 126. See SYMANTEC, COMPREHENSIVE THREAT MANAGEMENT: A SYMANTEC SOLUTION FOR 
MODERN-DAY ATTACK PROTECTION 4–5 (2006), http://wp.bitpipe.com/resource/org_939987896_418/ 
10510712_CTM_wp_edp.pdf?site_cd=fbs (explaining that hacker motivation to make money, coupled 
with a lower bar for developing malicious software, has steadily increased the number of threats to 
computer security); THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 8 (Feb. 
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL 
STRATEGY]; Smedinghoff, supra note 28, at 17. Due to the plethora of tools used by hackers, there has 
been a “precipitous drop in the time that it takes for a new threat to be developed.” SYMANTEC, supra, 
at 5. See also DAVID SANCHO, ROOTKITS: THE NEW WAVE OF INVISIBLE MALWARE IS HERE (2005), 
http://www.trendmicro.com/NR/rdonlyres/388874B6-C27C-4354-9078-42771EABEBB1/18503/ 
rootkitwp.pdf (explaining the emergence of rootkits technology used by malware developers to infiltrate 
computers that is difficult to detect with antiviral software); Joris Evers, Office Hit by Another Security 
Problem, CNET NEWS.COM, June 22, 2006, http://news.zdnet.com/Office+hit+by+another+security+ 
problem/2100-1009_22-6087161.html (explaining a weakness in software that allows cyber-attackers to 
access sensitive information). 
 127. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 126, at 5, 8–9; Smedinghoff, supra note 28, at 17 
(explaining that information security is a “moving target”). 
 128. Uncertainty in the negligence standard also compounds the challenges faced by jurors 
assessing the care taken by a defendant in its information-security practices. While lay juries ordinarily 
have difficulty assessing negligence in complicated technical cases, juries may have an especially 
challenging time assessing a database operator’s care over its security system given the rapid changes in 
technologies and new risks, which will cause experts to present diverging, yet convincing, views. See 
STEPHEN BREYER, ECONOMIC REASONING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER 
2003 DISTINGUISHED LECTURE 12 (Dec. 4, 2003) (2004) (noting the difficulty courts have in assessing 
the “outer bounds of what is reasonable in technical subject matter areas” such as those involving 
computers where the parties offer warring expert testimony). Although judges serve as gatekeepers over 
the admissibility of technical expert testimony under Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 
(1999), jurors will still wrestle with the clashing views of computer security experts whose testimony is 
deemed admissible. 
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personal information in computer databases.129 No amount of due care will 
prevent significant amounts of sensitive data from escaping into the hands 
of cyber-criminals. Such data leaks constitute the predictable residual risks 
of information reservoirs. 
Consequently, negligence will not efficiently manage the residual 
risks of hazardous databases. Negligence would neither induce database 
operators to change their activity level nor discourage marginal actors from 
collecting sensitive information because such operators need not pay for 
the accident costs of their residual risk.130 
The high levels of residual risk suggest treating cyber-reservoirs as 
ultrahazardous activities—those with significant social utility and 
significant risk—that warrant strict liability.131 As Judge Richard Posner 
has explained, ultrahazardous activities often involve something “new” that 
society has “little experience” securing, where neither the injurer nor victim 
 
 129. See LAWRENCE A. GORDON ET AL., COMPUTER SECURITY INSTITUTE, 2005 CSI/FBI 
COMPUTER CRIME AND SECURITY SURVEY 11 (2005), available at http://i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/db_area/ 
pdfs/fbi/FBI2005.pdf (explaining that “[t]echnical computer security measures such as use of 
passwords, biometrics, anti-virus software and intrusion detection systems cannot totally reduce an 
organization’s risk of computer security breaches and the associated financial losses”); PHOENIX 
TRUSTCONNECTOR, THE TRUSTED-CONNECTION LANDSCAPE 1 (Sept. 1, 2005), http://research. 
telephonyonline.com/detail/RES/1126533537_228.html&src=TRM_TOPN (explaining that despite 
firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and user authentication tools, information systems are being 
successfully penetrated due to rapid growth of malicious software and innovative hackers); John 
Dobberstein, Crime Online: State Businesses, Law Enforcement Officials and Other Groups Are Trying 
to Stop Hackers and Cyber Terrorists, TULSA WORLD, July 23, 2006, at E1 (citing survey results 
establishing that passwords, biometrics, anti-virus software, and intrusion detection systems “cannot 
totally reduce an organization’s risk of computer security breaches”); Smedinghoff, supra note 28, at 19 
(noting that ”[a]t some level, security breaches may be inevitable” ). 
 130. See SHAVELL, supra note 122, at 46. 
 131. Today’s hazardous cyber-reservoirs would fall outside the current Restatement’s description 
of abnormally dangerous activities. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL HARM § 20 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Apr. 6, 2005) (abnormally dangerous activities must 
involve “a . . . risk of physical harm” (emphasis added)); Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 642 A.2d 
180, 188 (Md. 1994) (declining to extend the doctrine of strict liability to embrace economic harm). 
Nonetheless, information reservoirs share the defining characteristics of the Restatement’s abnormally 
dangerous activities such as blasting and water reservoirs—high utility and high risk. In Kenneth 
Abraham’s view, abnormally dangerous activities are governed by strict liability so as to protect victims 
who “are unlikely to know much about” the activity and cannot protect themselves against its risks. 
ABRAHAM, supra note 121, at 169. This rationale applies to information reservoirs as individuals whose 
data is collected by data brokers know little about where their data resides and can do nothing to 
prevent database operators from amassing their sensitive data. Although hazardous information 
reservoirs do not fall within the Restatement prescription of an abnormally dangerous activity, a strong 
argument exists for extending that definition of abnormally dangerous activities to include bursting 
cyber-reservoirs. In revisiting the Restatement view of abnormally dangerous activities, the American 
Law Institute ought to consider compensable harm in the twenty-first century to include injuries to our 
market identity caused by the release of sensitive personal data. See infra Part IV.D. (discussing the 
need for a change in our conception of harm in the Information Age). 
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can prevent the accident by taking greater care.132 This characterized water 
reservoirs in nineteenth-century England.133 Strict liability creates an 
incentive for actors engaging in ultrahazardous activities to “cut back on 
the scale of the activity . . . to slow its spread while more is learned about 
conducting it safely.”134 
Classifying database collection as an ultrahazardous activity is a 
logical extension of Posner’s analysis. Just as no clear safety standard 
governing the building and maintenance of water reservoirs had emerged in 
the 1850s, a stable set of information-security practices has not yet 
materialized today.135 Individuals can do nothing to ensure their 
information remains safely inside an entity’s database, especially those 
who have no idea that their data resides there. Database operators, too, are 
limited in what they can do to protect cyber-reservoirs from significant 
leaks given the “inevitability” of data-security breaches, even with 
seemingly responsible levels of precaution against such breaches.136 
In this analysis, strict liability has the potential to encourage a change 
in activity level respecting the storage of sensitive personal information, 
unless and until more information allows operators to better assess optimal 
precaution levels and to respond to the persistent problem of residual 
risk.137 Because strict liability would force database operators to internalize 
the full costs of their activities, marginally productive database operators 
might refrain from maintaining cyber-reservoirs of personal data. Strict 
liability also may decrease the collection of ultrasensitive data among those 
who are at greatest risk of security breaches. Moreover, as insurance 
markets develop in this emerging area, database operators that continue 
collecting sensitive information will be better positioned to assess the cost 
 
 132. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, 
J.); POSNER, supra note 120, at 180 (citing A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: 
The Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1984)). 
 133. POSNER, supra note 120, at 180. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See supra Part IV.A–B (discussing cyber-security). 
 136. See Smedinghoff, supra note 28, at 19. 
 137. For example, employers storing employee SSNs for tax reporting can discontinue using them 
as a form of employee identification. See Stolen Social Security Number Records Prompt Lawsuit 
Against Union Pacific, 29 U.S. RAIL NEWS 111 (2006) (describing a complaint asserting that a data-
security breach resulted from a company’s use of employee SSNs for identification and arguing that the 
employer should only have used SSNs for tax reporting). Organizations can also disconnect databases 
containing ultrasensitive information from the Internet to prevent hacking. Additionally, organizations 
can store biometric information on Smart Cards, which permit individuals to carry their biometrics on a 
card, instead of in centralized databases subject to theft. See Int’l Biometric, supra note 67, at 22, 24; 
Sethi, supra note 34, at 120–21. 
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of residual risk and the extent to which they can spread the cost of such risk 
onto consumers.138 
Negligence lawsuits also fail to efficiently spread the costs of such 
residual harm. Law-and-economics scholars suggest that a liability regime 
should efficiently allocate the risk of unavoidable accident costs.139 This is 
only true when it is less costly for the industry to bear the cost of all 
accidents than for individual victims to purchase insurance.140 In the 
context of cyber-reservoirs, the most efficient cost-spreader is the database 
operator who need only buy one cyber-security insurance policy as 
opposed to the millions of identity-theft insurance policies that would be 
purchased by consumers.141 The cost-spreading advantages of database 
operators resemble those of defective-product manufacturers who sit in the 
best position to obtain insurance and distribute its costs “among the public 
as a cost of doing business” as opposed to only injured individuals.142 
 
 
 138. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-party Insurance Externality: An Economic 
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 135, 137–38 (1991). 
 139. E.g., id.; John E. Calfee & Clifford Winston, Economic Aspects of Liability Rules and 
Liability Insurance, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 16, 16 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford 
Winston eds., 1988). 
 140. See POSNER, supra note 120, at 181. 
 141. See infra note 239 (discussing the availability of cyber-risk insurance to database operators 
that covers third-party losses due to leaks of sensitive data and identity-theft insurance available to 
individuals). When the demand for a good is inelastic, a seller’s ability to pass on the cost of insurance 
to consumers is strong. Emerging technologies that offer highly valued services in thin markets, 
meaning that there are few substitutes, including massive computer databases containing sensitive 
information, are paradigmatic illustrations of markets characterized by inelastic demand. For a 
discussion of the concept of elasticity, see RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 131–39 
(2005); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 64–70 (16th ed. 1998). 
 142. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring). The maintenance of hazardous information reservoirs parallels the manufacture of 
defective products in other ways as well. Just as a person injured by a product is “not ordinarily in a 
position to refute . . . evidence [about a manufacturing process] or identify the cause of the defect,” id., 
here, too, individuals will have great difficulty identifying the flaws in a database operator’s security 
system and proving a database operator’s negligence. And like the consumer who lacks the skill to 
investigate the soundness of a product, individuals have no knowledge about where their data resides, 
let alone the ability to assess the security provided their personal data. See generally KENNETH S. 
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 64–100 (1986) and 
Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an Idea, 64 MD. 
L. REV. 573 (2005) for insightful discussions of liability insurance. 
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C.  ABSENCE OF CLEAR NORMS 
Scholars espousing a moral view conceive of negligence as setting 
forth norms to guide future behavior.143 A preexisting norm of safe cyber-
security practices, however, cannot be established given the ever-changing 
tactics, and increasing sophistication, of those seeking to bypass cyber-
security measures to steal valuable personal data and the rapid proliferation 
of computer network vulnerabilities.144 Because information security is a 
“moving target,” negligence litigation cannot signal to database operators 
reasonable cyber-security practices to follow.145 As Kenneth Abraham 
argues, “[i]n the absence of independent, pre-existing norms of behavior, 
the very idea of negligence is shaky.”146 
In sum, the Information Age’s insecure cyber-reservoirs require a 
different solution given the deficiencies of a negligence regime. As Mark 
Geistfeld explains, “[w]henever negligence liability loses its deterrence 
advantage,” strict liability better addresses “risk reduction and injury 
compensation.”147 The following part explores the law’s treatment of the 
valuable yet highly risky technologies of another era—the Industrial Age—
and the Rylands model of strict liability for entities gathering substances 
that do serious mischief upon their escape. It lays the groundwork for 
adopting Rylands to manage the harm of the Information Age’s hazardous 
cyber-reservoirs. 
V.  LESSONS FROM THE DAWN OF ANOTHER AGE: STRICT 
LIABILITY UNDER RYLANDS V. FLETCHER 
Oliver Wendell Holmes offered strict liability as a solution when 
negligence could not deter unsafe practices: “the safest way to secure care 
is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall be 
 
 143. See Abraham, supra note 122, at 1191; Robert E. Keeton, Is There a Place for Negligence in 
Modern Tort Law?, 53 VA. L. REV. 886, 889–90 (1967) (explaining that adjudications of negligence 
“place [a] mark of legal disapproval, with all its practical consequences, on identifiable types of conduct 
[that] may influence the attitudes and future behavior” of others); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil 
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 743 (2003) (explaining that the norms of tort law 
are “directive and conduct-oriented: they enjoin persons from treating others in certain ways and from 
interfering with others’ interests in certain ways,” serving as “guidance rules”). 
 144. See NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 126, at 8; SYMANTEC, supra note 126, at 4–5 
(explaining that hacker motivation to make money, coupled with a lower bar for developing malicious 
software, has steadily increased the number of threats to computer security). 
 145. See Smedinghoff, supra note 28, at 17. 
 146. Abraham, supra note 122, at 1203, 1223. 
 147. Mark Geistfeld, Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 
585, 618 (2003). 
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taken.”148 Holmes highlighted Rylands as a model for redressing the 
dangers of rapidly changing technologies at the dawn of the Industrial 
Age.149 Holmes’s words have great significance as we find ourselves in a 
time of accelerating technological change in this Information Age. 
This part explores Rylands and the classic accounts of that decision in 
the Industrial Age. Many of the debates surrounding Rylands purport to be 
about justice but in fact reflect the economic necessities of the era.150 At the 
time of Rylands, Britain had sustained a generation of economic expansion 
largely associated with industrialization.151 Great technological progress 
catapulted the British standard of living well above that of any other 
nation.152 America, on the other hand, had just begun its industrial journey 
in the 1860s.153 Nevertheless, many of the arguments against the 
application of Rylands in the United States receded as the country’s 
economy strengthened and as the risks of bursting reservoirs and other 
industrial hazards escalated.154 
 
 148. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 117 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881); Abraham, 
supra note 122, at 1222 (explaining that “flaws in the negligence standard should make us much more 
willing to consider proposals for no-fault alternatives to liability for negligence”). Although Holmes is 
widely regarded as a proponent of negligence and a foe of strict liability, Holmes approved of strict 
liability for the foreseeable risks of high risk and high social utility activities such as the maintenance of 
reservoirs. See The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652, 653, 663 (1873) (wherein Holmes discusses the 
justifications for strict liability vis-à-vis Rylands v. Fletcher); DAVID ROSENBERG, THE HIDDEN 
HOLMES: HIS THEORY OF TORTS IN HISTORY 9 (1995) (noting that many scholars overlooked Holmes’s 
approval of Rylands). 
 149. The Theory of Torts, supra note 148, at 653, 663. 
 150. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 356–66, 519. See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 142 (1992) 
(discussing how social and economic necessities influence legal decisions). 
 151. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 224 (2005). 
 152. Id. at 54. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See infra notes 208–16. The evolving law of water rights in the nineteenth century similarly 
illustrates the profound role played by economic concerns in the shaping of law. See MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 34–35 (1977). In the early 
nineteenth century, courts viewed land not as a productive asset but as a private estate to be enjoyed for 
its own sake, finding any nonconsensual interference with the natural flow of water illegal. Id. at 36. As 
industrialization began to take root, however, courts eroded the restrictive common law rules to permit 
extensive, uncompensated use of water for business purposes. Id. at 36–37. As the economy 
strengthened during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, courts began to strike a balance 
between competing land uses, only freeing economically desirable but injurious activities from legal 
liability if they were exercised with due care. Id. at 102. 
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A.  THE RYLANDS V. FLETCHER MODEL 
Rylands v. Fletcher stands as a prominent example of strict liability in 
the Industrial Age.155 John Rylands, a textile mill owner in Lancaster, 
England, hired a contractor to build a reservoir because he needed an 
additional source of water for his steam-powered mill.156 In 1860, the 
reservoir failed and the water escaped into an abandoned mine shaft that 
connected with neighboring active coal mines owned by Thomas 
Fletcher.157 The reservoir water flooded the interlocking maze of tunnels, 
forcing Fletcher to abandon his coal mines.158 
Fletcher sued Rylands in the Court of the Exchequer, where he lost.159 
Fletcher then appealed to the Exchequer Chamber and won.160 Although 
Rylands might have been held liable for the negligence of his contractors 
who built the reservoir,161 the Exchequer Chamber judges held him liable 
regardless of fault.162 The House of Lords affirmed.163 Lord Chancellor 
held that a person who “brings on his land and collects and keeps there 
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes” must pay for all of the damage 
that “is the natural consequence of its escape.”164 
This century’s problem of escaping cyber-data is analogous to 
Rylands’s nineteenth-century response to collected substances that do 
mischief upon their escape. Some might suggest that the intervention of a 
third party, such as a hacker, would not fall within the “natural 
consequences” contemplated by Rylands. Rylands itself, however, involved 
an intervening actor—the contractor who negligently built the reservoir. 
More importantly, it is the collection of massive amounts of sensitive 
digital information in databases that creates the opportunity for leaks and 
misbehavior by third parties in much the same way that the collection of 
water in reservoirs rendered the water inside vulnerable to negligent 
construction of the dam or gravity itself. A third party’s criminal acts are 
the natural consequences of maintaining information reservoirs in much the 
 
 155. See Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330, 338–40 (H.L.); Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher: Tort Law’s Conscience, in TORTS STORIES 207, 207 (Robert L. Rabin & 
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 156. Fletcher v. Rylands, (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737, 739–40 (Exch.). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Simpson, supra note 132, at 241–42. 
 159. Fletcher, 159 Eng. Rep. at 743–47. 
 160. Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265, 279 (Exch.). 
 161. 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 119, at 191. 
 162. Fletcher, 1 L.R. Exch. at 279. 
 163. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330, 338–40, 342 (H.L.). 
 164. Id. (quoting Fletcher, 1 L.R. Exch. at 279). 
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same way that flooding due to gravity or negligence naturally accompanied 
water reservoirs.  
Thus, for analytic purposes, leaks due to hacking are akin to the pull 
of gravity on water reservoirs. Any possible resistance to applying Rylands 
to cases involving the criminal acts of third parties on the grounds that the 
criminal actor ought to be found and pursued for the victim’s damages is 
seemingly inapplicable here given the illusive nature of criminal hackers 
who mask their identities and strike from unidentifiable distances. The 
criminal acts of computer hackers constitute the “natural consequences” of 
amassing sensitive databases given the statistical certainty that such 
computer hackers will breach computer databases to steal sensitive 
personal data.165 Furthermore, I offer the Rylands model as a metaphor to 
conceptualize the utility and the risks of information reservoirs at the dawn 
of the Information Age, not as a direct doctrinal fit.166  
The following sections will explore the intellectual reactions to 
Rylands and the substantive merits of applying a formulation minted at the 
dawn of one economic era to the problems of another. 
B.  THE CLASSIC RESPONSES TO RYLANDS 
In the Industrial Age, commentators grappled with the law’s response 
to accidents caused by the flooding of reservoirs critical to industry. In 
some respects, their thinking tracked the arc of the economy as it emerged 
from a fledgling industrializing state to a vibrant industrialized one. In 
other respects, their views reflected the morality of the times. 
In Britain and the United States, intellectuals of the Industrial Age 
hailed from several different schools of thought, including formalism, 
utilitarianism, materialism, and economic moralism. This section discusses 
the British response to Rylands and then turns to the American reaction to 
the decision that followed in the 1870s.167 
 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 46–72 (discussing the ultrahazardous nature of computer 
databases). 
 166. See infra text accompanying notes 217–24 (discussing Rylands as a powerful metaphor to 
conceptualize the new cyber-harms of the twenty-first century). 
 167. See, e.g., Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 449–50 (1873) (finding Rylands “contrary to 
American authority, as well as to [the Court’s] understanding of legal principles”). 
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1.  The British Response 
a.  Formalists 
British formalists stressed the logical consistency of legal opinions.168 
The Lords who heard Rylands demonstrated their formalist approach when 
they professed that the case did not involve a novel proposition.169 As the 
Lord Chancellor observed, “the principles on which this case must be 
determined appear . . . to be extremely simple.”170 The judges promulgated 
a general rule of strict liability for escaping substances, of which liability 
for the escape of fire, cattle, or water was an example.171 Because British 
courts endorsed strict liability for other things or substances before 
Rylands, the Lords asserted that they were simply upholding prevailing 
legal principles.172 
b.  Utilitarians 
The utilitarians envisioned tort law as a tool of social progress.173 To 
them, Rylands responded to the “magnitude of the danger” posed by 
reservoirs and other industrial hazards.174 The desire to eliminate future 
accidents, most especially those involving exploding dams, precipitated 
 
 168. See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 339 (2001); Roscoe Pound, The End of Law 
as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195, 204 (1914). “[F]ormalism maintains 
that because law is internally intelligible, it does not require, nor would it be useful for it to have, the 
assistance of any external discipline, such as history, economics, social science, or philosophy, as part 
of its understanding or justification.” Ken Kress, Formalism, Corrective Justice and Tort Law, 77 IOWA 
L. REV. i, i (1992). 
 169. See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 119, at 190; F.H. Newark, The Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 
L.Q. REV. 480, 487 (1949). 
 170. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330, 338 (H.L.). 
 171. See Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265, 279–81 (Exch.); 3 HARPER ET AL., supra 
note 119, at 191–92. But cf. Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the 
Development of the Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172, 184–85 (1892) (embracing a scientific 
approach to tort law, a subspecies of formalism, which questions the extent to which Rylands truly 
follows from established tort law involving fire and escaping cows). 
 172. See Newark, supra note 169, at 487. At the time of Rylands, the English tradition 
distinguishing trespass and trespass on the case prevailed, a distinction that is largely extinct in 
contemporary times. I do not mean to equate the nature of the interest invaded in Rylands—land—with 
that harmed by the release of cyber-data today. Instead, this Article discusses why Rylands serves as a 
powerful metaphor for the release of sensitive personal data from the Information Age’s cyber-
reservoirs. 
 173. See MENAND, supra note 168, at 339 (grouping legal theories that emphasize social 
consequences of the law under the rubric “utilitarian”); 1 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 512–13 
(1959); Zipursky, supra note 143, at 696. Utilitarian judges “fashioned rules” to prevent “future harms.” 
See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (1929). 
 174. FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 307 (Phila., Blackstone Publ’g Co. 1887); 
Frederick Pollock, Duties of Insuring Safety: The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 2 L.Q. REV. 52 (1886) 
[hereinafter Pollock, Duties]. 
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Rylands,175 as did the wish to provide compensation for the injuries they 
caused.176 
In 1887, Sir Frederick Pollock explained that British law “takes 
notice” that certain activities are a source of “extraordinary risk” such that 
a person who exposes his neighbor to such risks must “insure” his neighbor 
against harm, even if the activity itself is not wrongful.177 Pollock noted 
that because Rylands was a “hard rule,” it needed strong evidentiary 
support or “clear grounds of policy.”178 The prevention or compensation, or 
both, of flooding reservoirs warranted Rylands.179 
2.  The American Response 
a.  Materialists 
American materialists envisioned judicial decisions as a measure of, 
and a tool to promote, industry’s health.180 To some, the affluence of 
British industry explained and justified the decision,181 as mill owners 
could afford to pay for the accidents they caused regardless of fault.182 But 
 
 175. See John Murphy, The Merits of Rylands v. Fletcher, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 643, 649 
(2004) (explaining that three references to alkali works in the Exchequer Chamber’s decision in Rylands 
illustrate that concerns of industrial harms were on the forefront of judges’ minds). Deadly reservoir 
failures occurred just before, and during, the Rylands decisions, raising the public’s fear about the 
collection of water in reservoirs. Simpson, supra note 132, at 244–51 (arguing that well–known dam 
failures prompted Rylands). See also ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 109 
(1923) (explaining that Rylands reflected a social-justice ethic prominent in 1860s England that sought 
to protect individuals from industrial harm and provided for the public’s “general security”). 
 176. See POLLOCK, supra note 174, at 307; Pollock, Duties, supra note 174, at 52. 
 177. POLLOCK, supra note 174, at 307. 
 178. Id. at 311. 
 179. See id.; POUND, supra note 175, at 109. 
 180. See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE 
WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 8 (2004). 
 181. See FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 351 (1926) [hereinafter BOHLEN, 
STUDIES]; Francis H. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher: Part I, 59 U. PA. L. REV. 298, 303 
(1911); Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1960). 
 182. See BOHLEN, STUDIES, supra note 181, at 368–69 (“What may appear desirable in an ancient 
and highly organized society whose natural resources have been gradually and fully developed may be 
utterly inappropriate and harmful in a newly settled country whose natural resources still require 
exploitation.”); Green, supra note 181, at 5 (“[W]e do know that in England at this time a new and 
prosperous industry as milling could well afford to bear the risks it imposed on the older and equally if 
not more important mining industry.”); Kenzo Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modern Civil 
and Common Law, 16 ILL. L. REV. 163, 168 (1921) (attributing the Rylands decision to the growth of 
commerce and the rise of large-scale enterprises that could spread the cost of accidents). Bohlen also 
suggested, to much criticism, that the judges hearing the case in the House of Lords hailed from or 
aspired to the landed gentry and thus adopted a rule that would advance the protection of their interests 
over the commercial interests of the enterprising middle class. BOHLEN, STUDIES, supra note 181, at 
369. Others have refuted this classist explanation of Rylands. See POUND, supra note 175, at 106–07. 
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the materialists objected to the application of Rylands to 1870s America.183 
They reasoned that the fledgling U.S. industry could not grow if it was 
saddled with the costs of faultless accidents.184 In Brown v. Collins,185 
Judge Charles Doe of the New Hampshire Supreme Court captured the 
materialists’ concerns, declaring Rylands antithetical to “progress and 
improvement.”186 The materialists explained that Rylands would at least 
slow down the journey toward civilization and economic growth,187 and, at 
worst, “bring all economic action to a halt.”188 
b.  Utilitarians 
American utilitarians, much like their British counterparts, envisioned 
Rylands as a means to combat industrial hazards. Rylands would “pressure” 
industry to “keep in hand” dangerous conditions for the public’s safety.189 
Utilitarians looked to Oliver Wendell Holmes who wrote, in 1873, that 
Rylands was a “politic” means to prevent dangers caused by “extra-
hazardous” activities,190 such as reservoirs and other new industrial risks.191 
 
See generally Robert Thomas Molloy, Fletcher v. Rylands: A Reexamination of Juristic Origins, 9 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 266 (1942) (explaining that the middle-class backgrounds of some House of Lords judges 
refutes Bohlen’s class thesis). 
 183. See BOHLEN, STUDIES, supra note 181, at 369 (explaining the U.S. rejection of Rylands as 
partly attributable to the country’s pressing need to encourage material development); Green, supra note 
181, at 5 (same). 
 184. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 351 (explaining that absolute liability rules like that imposed in 
Rylands were initially rejected in the United States because they risked strangling the economy); W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 548–49 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining 
that late-nineteenth-century courts rejected the strict-liability standard because it would be too great a 
burden on the industrial and commercial development of the country). But see generally Gary T. 
Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth–century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 
1717 (1981) (rejecting the thesis that tort law of the nineteenth century adopted a fault-based standard 
in order to subsidize industry). 
 185. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873). 
 186. Id. at 448. See also Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873) (condemning the strict-
liability rule of Rylands as incompatible with the development of “factories, machinery, dams, canals 
and railroads”); Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459–60 (Pa. 1886) (rejecting Rylands as “wholly 
inapplicable” to the case at bar and noting that the coal industry serves “a great public interest”). 
 187. II SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN RELATIONS NOT RESTING IN 
CONTRACT 1234–35 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1880). See also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, 
The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the 
Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 348–49, 350 (2000) (explaining that New York and New Hampshire 
court decisions in the late nineteenth century suggested a concern for economic growth that outweighed 
the desire to protect urban populations from industrial risks). 
 188. WITT, supra note 180, at 48. See also FOWLER VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 338 (1933) (explaining that the early rejection of Rylands in the U.S. grew out of concern for 
the business community). 
 189. See POUND supra note 175, at 109–10. 
 190. Davis v. Rich, 62 N.E. 375, 377 (Mass. 1902) (Holmes, C.J.) (“When knowledge of the 
damage done or threatened to the public is established, the strict rule of Rylands v. Fletcher is not in 
CITRO10 1/31/2007 9:40:58 PM 
2007] RESERVOIRS OF DANGER 275 
Dam tragedies in the 1880s prompted utilitarians to call for the 
adoption of Rylands. In 1889, a dam at an exclusive club in Johnstown, 
Pennsylvania, broke.192 Two thousand people died and $17 million in 
property was destroyed.193 That year, editors of the American Law 
Review194 asked “[w]hat is the responsibility of a corporation or person 
who collects on his land a vast body of water, and does not sufficiently 
restrain it as to prevent its being turned loose . . . upon the unsuspecting 
inhabitants below?”195 The authors argued that Rylands offered the “best 
answer.”196 
c.  Economic Moralists 
Economic moralists advocated individual self-determination under a 
laissez-faire philosophy of natural justice.197 For them, Rylands offended 
morality by imposing liability on those not at fault for accidents.198 
 
question.”); The Theory of Torts, supra note 148, at 653, 663. As Louis Menand explains, Holmes did 
not view the law from a monolithic utilitarian lens. MENAND, supra note 168, at 341 (explaining that 
Holmes saw law’s development as guided by utility, morality, doctrinal consistency, and historical 
concerns). See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing scholarly interpretations of Holmes’s 
views on negligence and strict liability). 
 191. The Theory of Torts, supra note 148, at 663. Holmes’s “extra-hazardous” activities bear a 
strong connection to contemporary concepts of abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activities. 
Compare id. at 653, 666, with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Apr. 6, 2005) (stating that abnormally dangerous activities subject the 
actor to strict liability for physical harm caused by that activity), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 520 (1977) (explaining that courts, in determining whether an activity is abnormally 
dangerous, should consider, among other things, the high degree of risk of harm to the person, land, or 
chattel and the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage). See supra note 131 
(discussing how a Rylands approach to today’s insecure cyber-reservoirs might accord with the 
Restatement view). 
 192. DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD 264 (1968); NORMAN SMITH, A HISTORY 
OF DAMS 177–78 (1971). 
 193. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 192, at 264; SMITH, supra note 192, at 177–78. 
 194. The American Law Review, a bimonthly publication, was probably “the most influential legal 
periodical of the nineteenth century.” THOMAS A. WOXLAND & PATTI J. OGDEN, LANDMARKS IN 
AMERICAN LEGAL PUBLISHING 48 (1990). 
 195. Note, The Law of Bursting Reservoirs, 23 AM. L. REV. 643, 646 (1889). 
 196. Id. at 647. See also Ariz. Employers’ Liab. Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 432–33 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
concurring) (“There is no more certain way of securing attention to the safety of the men . . . than by 
holding the employer liable for accidents. . . . [T]hey probably will happen a good deal less often when 
the employer knows that he must answer for them if they do.”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-
law Background of Nineteenth-century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1128 (1990) (explaining that 
nineteenth-century judges used tort law as a tool to encourage moral behavior, minimize injuries, and 
promote honesty and fair dealing in economic relationships); Takayanagi, supra note 182, at 172. 
 197. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 78 (1974) (explaining nineteenth-century 
tort law’s deference to free individual action and decision). 
 198. See WITT, supra note 180, at 47 (explaining the view that strict liability unethically fined the 
“free exercise of the nonnegligent injurer’s rights”); James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. 
REV. 97, 99, 103 (1908). 
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Economic moralists envisioned “man [as] a free agent to be left to his own 
fortunes” whose autonomy would be compromised if he were charged with 
harms that could not be avoided by taking due care.199 Rylands also 
unethically allowed “unmeritorious or even culpable plaintiffs to use the 
machinery of the court” to collect money from “blameless defendants.”200 
C.  RYLANDS’S PATH TO ACCEPTANCE IN AMERICA 
British formalists and utilitarians upheld Rylands in the decades after 
the decision. The fear of reservoir accidents, coupled with industry’s ability 
to distribute the cost of accidents through insurance, weakened laissez-faire 
arguments favoring a fault-based approach.201 As John Murphy explains, 
Rylands was “neither immoral nor enterprise-inhibiting.”202 
By contrast, Rylands’s chance for acceptance in the United States 
appeared slight in the 1870s.203 The protectionist view of the materialists 
predominated.204 The economic moralists proclaimed that the “ethical 
standard of reasonable conduct” had prevailed over “the unmoral standard 
of acting at one’s peril.”205 
But that trend reversed itself at the turn of the twentieth century.206 At 
that time, a strong majority of U.S. courts adopted Rylands, including many 
states that had previously rejected it.207 The materialist objections to 
Rylands receded in the face of America’s industrial boom.208 Hazardous 
enterprises, though socially valuable, could “pay their way,”209 much as 
 
 199. Green, supra note 173, at 255. See also YEHOSHUA ARIELI, INDIVIDUALISM AND 
NATIONALISM IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 334 (1964) (“Competitive economic activity was . . . not only 
the way to progress but the principle of natural justice.”); WITT, supra note 180, at 46–47. 
 200. Ames, supra note 198, at 103. 
 201. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 368 (9th ed. 1998); Murphy, supra note 175, at 
665. 
 202. Murphy, supra note 175, at 665 (internal footnote omitted). See also John H. Wigmore, 
Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History—III., 7 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452–56 (1894) (discussing the 
progression of tort liability standards from negligence to the no-fault rule of Rylands). 
 203. See Shugerman, supra note 187, at 338–39 (noting that only three states—Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, and Pennsylvania—accepted Rylands by the end of the 1870s). 
 204. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 365 (stating that Rylands was “too much, too soon” for the 
American economy); KEETON ET AL., supra note 184, at 549. 
 205. Ames, supra note 198, at 99. 
 206. See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 119, at 195 (the “prevailing” twentieth–century view of the 
rule in Rylands was one of acceptance, rather than rejection); Shugerman, supra note 187, at 345. 
 207. Shugerman, supra note 187, at 345. 
 208. Id. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 184, at 549.  
 209. KEETON ET AL., supra note 184, at 549; Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to 
Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 382–83 (1951). See also Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 22 A. 
649, 651 (Pa. 1891) (holding “the production of iron or steel or glass” while of great public importance 
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British industry could in the 1860s.210 A “strong and growing” sentiment 
queried: “in view of the exigencies of social justice who can best bear the 
loss?”211 Utilitarian concerns also contributed to the pro–Rylands trend, 
prompting courts to apply Rylands in cases involving crowded urban 
conditions212 and industrial hazards.213 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, in The Path of the Law, remarked that the 
law of torts started with the “old days of isolated, ungeneralized wrongs” 
like assault, whereas the majority of the torts at the end of the nineteenth 
century were “incidents of certain well known businesses.”214 Just as the 
Industrial Age saw a shift from individualized wrongs to generalized perils, 
the Information Age brings another fundamental shift in the field of 
accidents, from mass physical injuries to today’s cyber-harms. The next 
part explores why strict liability is as appropriate a response to the new 
risks posed by today’s cyber-reservoirs as it was to the emerging risks of 
the early Industrial Age. 
VI.  THE CASE FOR RYLANDS V. FLETCHER AND THE CYBER-
RESERVOIRS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Two characteristic trends converged upon Rylands’s adoption in 
Britain and the United States—the maturation of industry and the salience 
of industry’s new hazards. Before those trends came together, fault 
dominated within tort law.215 Only after massive reservoir failures, such as 
the Johnstown Flood, and the strong growth of industry did American 
courts embrace Rylands. 
 
is “the result[] of private enterprise” which “has no right to claim exemption from the natural 
consequences” of its acts). 
 210. Green, supra note 181, at 5. 
 211. Pound, supra note 168, at 233. See also Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 197 N.W. 
971, 972 (Minn. 1924) (articulating a social justice rationale for the adoption of Rylands); Green, supra 
note 181, at 258 (discussing the implications for moral change upon the development of tort law). 
 212. E.g., Davis v. Rich, 62 N.E. 375, 377 (Mass. 1902) (Holmes, C.J.) (discussing a leaking pipe 
that created an icy city sidewalk); Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 238–40 (1878) (stating that an 
employer was strictly liable for a collapsing wall that was negligently constructed by its employee); 
Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, 109 N.W. 114, 115 (Minn. 1906) (discussing a bursting city reservoir). 
 213. E.g., Balt. Breweries’ Co. v. Ranstead, 28 A. 273, 274 (Md. Ct. App. 1894); Bradford 
Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 54 N.E. 528, 531 (Ohio 1899) (discussing exploding 
nitroglycerine); Green v. Sun Co., 32 Pa. Super. 521, 529–30 (1907) (discussing an oil refinery). 
 214. Holmes, supra note 3, at 467. 
 215. ABRAHAM, supra note 121, at 167 (“Rylands was decided against the background late 
nineteenth-century rule that there was liability only upon proof” of negligence.). 
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That same pattern emerges today. Some commentators offer 
negligence to address today’s insecure databases.216 But a strict-liability 
approach becomes increasingly compelling as the biometrics and 
information-technology sectors mature, the cyber-risk insurance market 
grows, data leaks escalate, and incidents of identity theft and corporate 
espionage compound. 
This part argues that Rylands serves as a powerful metaphor to enrich 
our understanding of the new accidents in the Information Age. It offers 
parallels between the economic conditions at the time of Rylands’s 
adoption and this era, and explores how strict liability would meet the 
needs of many contemporary theorists as it did for Industrial Age 
intellectuals. Lastly, this part argues that the characteristic injuries of the 
Information Age deserve compensation due to our changing understanding 
of personhood in the twenty-first century. 
A.  A POWERFUL METAPHOR 
Metaphors have long had a profound impact on the way scholars and 
judges conceptualize problems.217 Although Rylands responded to the 
damage caused by bursting dams and other similar hazards, it also 
produced a metaphor for economically valuable, yet risky, technologies—a 
dynamic reservoir, amassing enormous power that provides great value if 
kept under control, but, if let loose as is inevitable, could wreak havoc on 
innocent people not involved in the enterprise. 
 
 216. See supra notes 109–19 and accompanying text. 
 217. See, e.g., J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 247 (1998) 
(discussing the use of metaphors and their effects); SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 27–28, 36–38, 55 
(invoking the tyrannical bureaucracy of Franz Kafka’s The Trial to describe commercial collection of 
personal data); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet: The Real 
Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 265, 268 (2006) 
(arguing that the judicial doctrine of cybertrespass resulted from the law’s reliance on metaphor); 
Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 718 (1995) (explaining that the nature of Internet law “depend[s] critically on 
the legal metaphors” used to describe the Internet and its functions); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place 
and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 459 (2003) [hereinafter Hunter, 
Cyberspace] (arguing that metaphors are “central to legal thinking” and profoundly influence judicial 
decisionmaking). See generally Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy and Precedent in Law, 50 
EMORY L.J. 1197, 1197 (2001) (arguing that “cognitive science models of human thinking explain how 
analogical reasoning and precedential reasoning operate in law”). But see RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 523–24 (1995) (“A way of thinking, metaphor, yes, but often of an undisciplined 
and misleading character.”). 
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The reservoir is a potent image for the collection of sensitive personal 
data in computer databases.218 Water is a particularly appropriate analogy 
to electronic data as both “flow according to the laws of physics.”219 
Personal information moves through “information pipelines,” providing 
great value to organizations in this Internet economy.220 Just as water in a 
reservoir is safe inside its confines, sensitive personal information is 
harmless if it remains inert. Now, as then, it is the uncontrolled release of 
the collected material—today’s being personal identifying data—that 
wreaks havoc. 
 Much as failed reservoirs permit water to escape onto land, leaking 
databases release sensitive personal information into cyberspace and into 
the hands of dishonest employees or hackers. Indeed, land is commonly 
invoked as a metaphor for cyberspace.221 Although the virtual world differs 
from the physical world in many ways, the image of cyberspace as 
apparently boundless land is compelling when envisioning Internet access 
to an organization’s computer databases. 222 A business’s internal computer 
 
 218. See O’HARROW, supra note 12, at 137–38 (recounting privacy expert Chris Hoofnagle’s 
explanation that extraordinary “reservoirs” of cyber-data constitute infrastructure of our surveillance 
society). 
 219. See Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 538 (2003) (noting that 
Internet trespass cases, which involve electrical charges, “are all about chasing down electronic ‘water’ 
in order to reclaim it”). 
 220. See SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 3, 19. See also Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data Sifted 
in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2006, at A1 (quoting an official describing the 
U.S. Government’s search of a massive database containing financial records “turning on every 
spigot . . . and seeing what water would come out”). 
 221. E.g., WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE, AND THE INFOBAHN 23 (1995) 
(analogizing the physical world to the world of the Internet); Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 73, 82–83 (2003) (arguing that websites look more like real property than ordinary chattel 
given the land-like descriptions of cyberspace and thus the rules of “real property” offer a “better fit” 
for the analysis of cyberspace issues); Hunter, Cyberspace, supra note 217, at 452, 516 (stating that 
many “treat cyberspace as if it were a physical place. . . . [It] may be inchoate and virtual, but no less 
real in our minds,” rendering attempts to supplant the metaphor tragically “doomed to failure”); Harold 
Smith Reeves, Comment, Property in Cyberspace, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 762 (1996) (“Current 
judicial and legislative approaches to Cyberspace rely on a conception of bounded property developed 
to regulate the ownership of land.”).  
 222. Mark Lemley offers a powerful critique of the “cyberspace as place” metaphor adopted by 
courts and scholars to justify applying real property laws to Internet law issues. See generally Lemley, 
supra note 219, at 521. But see Hunter, Cyberspace, supra note 217, at 452–53, 511–13 (challenging the 
perceived wisdom of those who conflate the idea that cyberspace has the characteristics of a place 
because it risks fencing off of the Internet, a tragedy of the “anticommons”). For Lemley, the metaphor 
should begin the inquiry, not end it. See Lemley, supra note 219, at 523. Lemley argues that courts 
ought to consider the context and effect of the proposed rules addressing cyberspace instead of 
reflexively applying real property rules to cyberspace law issues. Id. My analysis endeavors to avoid 
that blunder, offering the metaphor of water reservoirs to frame my discussion of the historical and 
theoretical reasons that support the application of Rylands to the problem of escaping valuable data. 
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network houses its proprietary data; the network welcomes visitors to its 
public areas from the “information superhighway,” allowing only a very 
limited list of people into areas designated for certain employees.223 
Computer databases stand as the network’s reservoirs, collecting the 
valuable personal information kept inside, as well as protecting it from 
escaping into cyberspace. 
The Rylands metaphor of the water reservoir enriches our 
understanding of accidents at the dawn of this Information Age.224 The 
following section will explore the historical arguments for the adoption of 
Rylands to current cyber-security breaches. 
B.  ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
The Information Age’s economy shares many parallels with the 
British economy of the 1860s. At that time, England was a mature, 
industrialized nation.225 Industry was booming.226 Cotton-textile production 
quadrupled in the years between 1820 and 1850; real income in the late 
1840s rose twenty percent above that of the 1830s; and railroads allowed 
factory owners to sell their goods to distant markets.227 Industry 
increasingly was able to pass on accident costs through insurance.228 
 
 223. In this analysis, I borrow from Mark Lemley’s notion that “private and public spaces must 
coexist on the Internet, just as they do in the physical world.” Lemley, supra note 219, at 537. See also 
MITCHELL, supra note 221, at 23 (“Many of the places in cyberspace are public, like streets and 
squares; access to them is uncontrolled. Others are private, like mailboxes and houses, and you can 
enter only if you have the key or can demonstrate that you belong.”). 
 224. In analogizing computer databases to reservoirs of valuable personal data, I do not mean to 
simply equate cyberspace with real property and databases with reservoirs. See Hunter, Cyberspace, 
supra note 217, at 487–88 (criticizing judicial decisions that treat a defendant’s damage to a plaintiff’s 
computer system as one involving real property, not personal property, due to the oversimplification of 
all tortious cyber-harm as involving real property law). I use the image of the water reservoir instead to 
illuminate how contemporary technologies are akin to those in Rylands’s time. To that end, I rely on the 
“interaction” theory of metaphor, which suggests that the combination of the “source” of the 
comparison and the target to which it is compared results in a “unique agent of meaning” that enriches 
our conceptualization of the dangers associated with the collection of personal identifying data at this 
juncture in our economic history. Janet Martin Soskice & Rom Harré, Metaphor in Science, in FROM A 
METAPHORICAL POINT OF VIEW: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO THE COGNITIVE CONTENT OF 
METAPHOR 289, 291 (Zdravko Radman ed., 1995). 
 225. See T.S. ASHTON, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: 1760–1830, at 114–15 (1968); FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 151, at 53–54. See also Christine MacLeod, Britain as Workshop of the World (Feb. 11, 
2004), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/trail/victorian_britain/industry-invention/britain-workshop-world-
01.shtml (explaining that by the Great Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851, Britain was the world’s 
industrial power, producing more than half of the world’s iron, coal, and cotton). 
 226. FRIEDMAN, supra note 151, at 53–54. 
 227. Id. at 53–54, 228. 
 228. Murphy, supra note 175, at 665. 
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Reservoirs, large and small, enriched the British landscape when water 
from John Rylands’s reservoir flooded Thomas Fletcher’s coal mines.229 
Although dams appeared in England in the eleventh century,230 the building 
of large reservoirs began in earnest in the late 1830s to provide water-
power for textile mills.231 By 1850, mill owners and towns increasingly 
used reservoirs to generate power and collect water for canals.232 
At that time, however, no clear safety standard concerning the 
building and maintenance of reservoirs had been established.233 As a result, 
Britain experienced two massive dam failures just before, and during, the 
Rylands decision.234 Those reservoir failures created “anxiety” about the 
“menacing” character of large dams.235 
The vitality and perils of the Information Age’s technologies are 
similar to those of the Industrial Age. Information and biometric 
technologies, as well as their applications, have grown greatly in the past 
five years.236 Information technology startups “no longer require lots of 
capital” because “they can build cheaply on Net infrastructure that didn’t 
exist 10 years ago.”237 The biometrics market projects sales of $6 billion by 
2010, up from $2.2 billion in 2006.238 Insurance companies now provide 
cyber-risk insurance that covers third-party losses due to data leaks.239 
 
 229. See Simpson, supra note 132, at 217. See also SMITH, supra note 192, at 170–73 (discussing 
the construction of dams during the early nineteenth century). See generally G.M. BINNIE, EARLY 
VICTORIAN WATER ENGINEERS (1981). 
 230. SMITH, supra note 192, at 164 (explaining that the first recorded dam in Great Britain was 
built in 1189). In the eleventh century, however, England had 5624 water mills and it is likely that many 
were powered “by dams of some sort, small though they must have been.” Id. at 165. 
 231. BINNIE, supra note 229, at 50. 
 232. See SMITH, supra note 192, at 169–80. 
 233. See BINNIE, supra note 229, at 50 (explaining that the widespread development of large 
reservoirs occurred in the late 1830s and 1840s to meet the water-power needs of mill owners); 
Simpson, supra note 132, at 217 (explaining that civil engineers in nineteenth-century England built 
reservoirs “on the basis of common sense, hunch, and experience, slowly augmented by a body of 
theoretical knowledge”). 
 234. Simpson, supra note 132, at 219–31 (describing the failure of the Bilberry dam in 1852, 
which killed seventy-eight people and caused massive property damage, and the flooding of the Dale 
Dyke dam in 1864). 
 235. Id. at 219. 
 236. See Gary Flake, A Virtual Roundtable: Seven Thought Leaders Sound Off on How 
Connectivity Is Changing the Planet, FORTUNE, July 10, 2006, at 104, 106. 
 237. Justin Hibbard & Heather Green, The Net: It Feels Like 1998 All over Again, BUS. WK., May 
22, 2006, at 30, 32 (describing $5.6 billion of venture capital investments in Internet startups in the first 
quarter of 2006). 
 238. Frommer, supra note 45. 
 239. Lawrence A. Gordon, Martin P. Loeb & Tashfeen Sohail, A Framework for Using Insurance 
for Cyber-risk Management, COMM. OF THE ACM, Mar. 2003, at 81, 81 (explaining that insurance 
allows firms to “hedge” potential losses from data-security breaches). The leading insurance companies 
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But in the ten years since the Internet has gained widespread use, a 
broadly accepted standard for securing today’s cyber-reservoirs has not 
emerged.240 In the first half of 2006, reports of massive data leaks appeared 
on a regular basis.241 Today, public fear about identity theft is rampant and 
justified.242 
The risks and rewards of some of today’s cyber-reservoirs lack 
proportionality in much the same way they did for the Industrial Age’s 
reservoirs. In the 1860s, a mill owner’s neighbors like Thomas Fletcher 
shouldered much of the harm when a reservoir failed. Although such 
neighbors enjoyed the healthy economy fostered by textile mills, their gain 
paled in the face of the harm caused by a reservoir’s flooding.243 
Today, the burdens and benefits of an information broker’s databases 
are not equitably distributed. Individuals struggle for years with the 
financial, emotional, and physical repercussions of data leaks inflicted upon 
them, having enjoyed little personal benefit from a data broker’s collection 
of their data. Just as many suffered greater risk than reward from their 
neighbors’ reservoirs, an individual’s benefit from an information broker’s 
collection of personal data is overshadowed by the harm suffered upon the 
information’s release. 
The parallels between the cyber-reservoir problem at the dawn of the 
Information Age and the reservoir problem of the Industrial Age extend 
beyond the economic conditions of the times. The following section 
 
now carry policies covering third-party risks arising from computer-security breaches, such as losses 
due to identity theft and an identity-theft victim’s mental anguish. Darwin Enhances Tech//404sm: New 
Cyber Liability, Technology E&O, and Internet Liability Coverage, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 26, 2006 
(describing liability insurance policies that cover unauthorized access, theft, and loss of data due to 
security breaches); Gregory D.L. Morris, Into the Breach, RISK & INS., Apr. 15, 2006, at 82, 82, 
available at http://www.riskandinsurance.com/060415_feature_4.asp (explaining that AIG, Chubb, and 
others carry data-security insurance covering a vendor’s failure to protect personal information). 
 240. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE NEW NEW THING: A SILICON VALLEY STORY (2000) 
(describing the advent of the Internet); Gordon et al., supra note 239, at 81 (explaining that cyber-
criminals successfully hacked into networks and databases of companies surveyed despite their near-
universal use of security measures). 
 241. E.g., Terry Frieden, John King, & Marsha Walton, Source: Theft of Vets’ Data Kept Secret 
for 19 Days, CNN.COM, May 23, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/23/vets.data/; FTC Laptop 
Theft Puts 110 People at Risk, REUTERS, June 23, 2006, available at http://news.zdnet.com/2100-
1009_22-6087218.html; Kiviat, supra note 55, at 68. See also Privacy Rights, Chronology, supra note 9 
(cataloguing hundreds of data breaches in 2005 and 2006). 
 242. See, e.g., Kiviat, supra note 55, at 68. 
 243. See Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1435 (2001) (“It would be easy to reach the conclusion that a reservoir 
externalizes far more non-reciprocated risk than benefit onto adjacent activities.”). 
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explores similarities in the intellectual history of the Industrial Age and that 
of the Information Age.  
C.  STRICT LIABILITY AND CONTEMPORARY TORT THEORY 
A strict-liability regime can be analyzed from a variety of different 
contemporary tort theories that share many of the values embraced by 
thinkers of the Industrial Age. Running through the debates surrounding 
Rylands in the Industrial Age were concerns about loss-spreading, accident 
prevention, and justice. Many of these intellectual themes recur today, 
providing profound theoretical support for a strict-liability solution for 
hazardous information reservoirs. 
1.  Instrumentalism 
Contemporary instrumentalism envisions tort law as a means to pursue 
policy objectives, such as “accident prevention, wealth maximization, and 
the widespread distribution of the economic losses resulting from 
accidents.”244 Efficient deterrence and enterprise liability theories support a 
strict-liability solution for today’s bursting cyber-reservoirs. Both theories 
embrace the nineteenth-century materialist’s preoccupation with industry’s 
ability to shoulder and distribute liability costs, on the one hand, and the 
utilitarian’s concern for safety precautions, on the other. Although both 
efficient deterrence and enterprise liability theories uphold tort law as an 
efficient means to prevent accidents, enterprise liability envisions the 
spreading of accident costs as tort law’s primary goal.245 
a.  Efficient Deterrence 
The efficient deterrence theory of leading law-and-economics scholar 
and jurist Guido Calabresi supports a strict-liability approach to hazardous 
 
 244. Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass 
Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 881–82 (2005) (footnotes omitted). See also John C.P. 
Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress 
of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 583 (2005) (arguing that “[w]hether couched in terms of James-Traynor 
loss-spreading, Prosserian utilitarian balancing, or Calabresi-Posner efficient deterrence, tort law has, 
since the late 1930s, been widely understood by academics to be just another way in which government 
regulates conduct for the public good”). 
 245. Compare CALABRESI, supra note 120, at 26–28 (discussing three subgoals of accident 
prevention, including a distributional goal), and Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for 
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060, 1084–85 (1972) (noting that the cheapest cost-avoider 
efficiency test cannot be explained solely in terms of distributional goals although such goals may be 
served by it), with VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY: 
RETHINKING TORT REFORM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 175–77 (1995) (arguing that 
contemporary enterprise liability theory is premised on loss-spreading). 
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information reservoirs. As Calabresi explains, tort law should minimize the 
costs of accidents, including the costs of avoiding accidents.246 Accident 
costs can be reduced by pursuing three goals. The first goal involves 
reducing the number and severity of accidents.247 The second goal concerns 
the reduction of the societal costs of accidents that are not worth preventing 
because it costs more to prevent them than to let them occur.248 The third 
goal is the reduction of the costs of administering an accident regime.249 
Because these three goals are “not fully consistent” with each other, an 
efficient liability regime would find the best combination of them, “taking 
into account what must be given up in order to achieve that reduction.”250 
Under Calabresi’s theory, liability should attach to the “cheapest cost 
avoider”—the party best suited to make the “cost-benefit analysis between 
accident costs and accident avoidance costs” and to act on that analysis.251 
In unclear cases, courts and juries deciding the identity of the cheapest cost 
avoider should consider whether “some distributional goals are not best 
served by one decision rather than the other.”252 The cheapest cost-avoider 
inquiry focuses on parties who would “actually bear a loss.”253 Calabresi 
envisions Rylands as deciding that the reservoir owner defendant was better 
suited to compare the benefits and the costs of the risks he took than the 
neighboring coal mine operator plaintiff.254 
Database operators constitute the cheapest cost avoiders vis-à-vis 
individuals whose information sits in a private entity’s database. Database 
operators have distinct informational advantages about the vulnerabilities 
in their computer networks.255 Individuals, by contrast, cannot detect and 
 
 246. CALABRESI, supra note 120, at 26.  
 247. Id. at 26–27. 
 248. Id. at 27–28, 44; Hanson & Logue, supra note 138, at 135 (arguing that law-and-economics 
scholars generally agree that an efficient products liability regime would encourage parties to “prevent 
all preventable accidents”—the deterrence goal—and would efficiently allocate the risk of unprevented 
accident costs—the insurance goal). 
 249. CALABRESI, supra note 120, at 28. 
 250. Id. at 29. 
 251. Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 245, at 1060 (emphasis omitted). See also CALABRESI, 
supra note 120, at 26–29; Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–4 
(1980) (arguing that strict liability is perfectly efficient where accidents are unilateral or not due to any 
fault of the victim). Negligence requires courts to examine all possibly relevant circumstances and to 
make a difficult, expensive, and often unreliable decision about reasonableness.  
 252. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 245, at 1083. 
 253. Id. at 1070. This focus on the actual loss-bearer does not mean that the liability rules differ 
between those who are insured and those who are uninsured. Id. at 1070 n.54. Instead, in devising a rule 
appropriate to a particular category of individuals, “the availability of insurance and other means of 
externalizing costs should be taken into account.” Id. 
 254. See id. at 1066. 
 255. See Swire, supra note 10, at 286. 
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understand the security offered by information brokers, employers, 
colleges, or biometric vendors.256 Even individuals knowledgeable about 
information security will find it difficult to assess how well a database 
system is designed and implemented.257 And it is unclear what such 
individuals could do if informed about a database operator’s vulnerabilities, 
particularly where they have no knowledge that an operator has amassed 
their data.258 Thus, the database operator sits in the best position to make 
decisions about the costs and benefits of its information-gathering. 
Individuals constitute actual loss bearers in a Calabresian calculus 
because they typically shoulder the losses due to identity theft, rather than 
passing them on through insurance. In 2005, identity-theft victims incurred 
significant financial expenses, most of which are not covered by basic 
homeowners’ insurance.259 Experts report that identity-theft insurance is 
not “worth the money”260 because it does not cover direct monetary losses 
incurred as a result of such theft.261 On the other hand, database operators 
can most efficiently spread the costs of data leaks by obtaining a single 
cyber-risk insurance policy as opposed to the countless identity-theft 
insurance policies obtained by individuals.262  
Imagine an information broker storing the SSNs of millions of 
individuals. The broker has exclusive knowledge about, and control over, 
its information system.263 Only the broker discovering a flaw in its 
information security system can assess the costs of fixing it. Individuals 
might be the cheapest cost-avoiders if they knew to, and could, remove 
their SSNs from a broker’s database. But individuals have no information 
 
 256. See id. See also SCHNEIER, supra note 23, at 29 (explaining that information technology is so 
advanced that individuals cannot evaluate risks in giving a credit card number to a website). In other 
words, information asymmetry exists between database operators and individuals. Database operators 
either know or can ascertain flaws in their security systems—individuals can do neither. 
 257. Swire, supra note 10, at 286. 
 258. See SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 81, 84–85. 
 259. See Herb Weisbaum, Why ID Theft Insurance Might Not Be Worth It, MSNBC.COM, May 8, 
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12692565/. Identity-theft coverage typically costs $20–$100 per 
year as a rider to a basic homeowner’s policy or as a stand-alone purchase with deductibles ranging 
from $100 to $1000. Id. Many policies do not cover legal fees or lost wages due to time away from 
work. Id. 
 260. Stop Thieves from Stealing You, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG., Oct. 2003, http://www.consumer 
reports.org/cro/consumer-protection/identity-theft-1003/overview/index.htm. 
 261. Id. (explaining that identity-theft policies seldom cover a victim’s out-of-pocket losses, 
which typically amount to $800); Weisbaum, supra note 259 (noting that many identity-theft policies 
do not cover legal fees or lost wages due to time away from work). 
 262. See supra notes 139–42 (discussing the efficiency of cost-spreading by database operators 
versus individuals). 
 263. Swire, supra note 10, at 286–87. 
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about, and have no practical means to find out, where their personal data 
resides. Even if individuals could determine the location of their personal 
data, they could not determine the degree of security afforded their 
information. Individuals also usually cannot ask an information broker to 
remove their data to avoid a leakage problem.264 As such, the database 
operator is best situated to make the optimal choice of either taking 
additional security precautions or insuring against security-breach losses. 
To that end, the law-and-economics theory of Calabresi provides strong 
support for a strict-liability solution for leaking cyber-reservoirs.265 
Some may argue that market negotiations would provide the optimal 
solution to the leaking database problem. Ronald Coase explains that in a 
case where there are no transaction costs, it makes no difference with 
respect to the efficient use of resources whether the law initially imposes 
liability on the injurer or lets the loss lie with the victim.266 Whichever side 
receives the initial grant of legal rights can negotiate with the other party to 
receive a payment in exchange for those rights. Under the Coase theorem, 
parties will bargain to an efficient result if transaction costs are low.267 
An optimal market solution to today’s hazardous reservoirs is not 
feasible. Coordinating the wishes of thousands, or millions, of individuals 
whose personal data is collected by an organization would be costly and 
challenging. For example, it would be exorbitantly expensive to bring 
together the two million customers of Pay By Touch to bargain with the 
biometric provider over the way it stores their fingerprint data. Large 
consumer blocks also encounter difficulty “express[ing] collectively their 
relative preferences . . . .”268 Coase’s theorem teaches that when transaction 
costs are high, then imposing liability on the party best able reduce costs 
 
 264. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text (discussing data brokers). Employees and 
students might be the cheapest cost-avoiders if they could refuse to provide their SSNs to colleges and 
employers. But both employees and students lack information to warrant such refusals because they 
cannot determine the degree of security afforded their information, much less how well their 
information is protected in future years. See, e.g., Privacy Rights, Chronology, supra note 9 (explaining 
that a data-security breach at Ohio University released SSNs of alumni as well as current students). 
Moreover, employees and students may not be in a position to bargain with employers and colleges 
about the disclosure of their SSNs. See SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 82–83.  
 265. Posner’s theory also supports a strict-liability approach to address the hazardous information 
reservoirs. See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text (applying Posner’s economic analysis to 
today’s leaking cyber-reservoirs). 
 266. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–8 (1960). 
 267. Id.  
 268. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 50 (1997). 
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results in the most efficient allocation of resources.269 Consequently, under 
this law-and-economics approach, strict liability would be the optimal 
substitute for difficult market negotiations concerning cyber-reservoirs. 
b.  Enterprise Liability 
Enterprise liability theory suggests strict liability to address today’s 
hazardous information reservoirs. This theory imposes the costs of a 
commercial entity’s profitable activities on that entity rather than on the 
individuals “who happen to be [the] victims.”270 Rylands v. Fletcher stands 
as a model illustration of this approach.271 Enterprise liability “asserts that 
actors should bear the costs of those accidents that are ‘characteristic’ of 
their activities and then distribute those costs among all those who benefit 
from the imposition of the risks at issue.”272 
Loss distribution and accident prevention constitute the animating 
principles of enterprise liability theory.273 Strict liability effectively 
distributes the costs of accidents given an enterprise’s superior ability to 
spread accident costs through insurance.274 The cost-pressures of higher 
insurance premiums also create incentives for enterprises to take safety 
precautions for their risky activities.275 Although enthusiasm for enterprise 
liability has waned in the past twenty years, it remains “alive and well” in 
 
 269. Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 27–28 
(1972) (explaining that where transacting costs of negotiation are high under Coase’s theorem, the legal 
system can “improve the allocation of resources by placing liability on that party who in the usual 
situation could be expected to avoid the costly interaction most cheaply”). 
 270. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-justification, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 653, 667 (2003). 
 271. See Fleming James, Jr., Accident Liability: Some Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L.J. 365, 
366 (1946); Clarence Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172, 
1176 (1952); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 476 (1985) (explaining that the 
father of enterprise liability theory, Fleming James, Jr., argued that the modern direction of law was 
away from a medieval fault-based approach and toward strict liability, with Rylands v. Fletcher and 
workers’ compensation plans as its “most prominent models”). 
 272. Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common Law Strict Liability, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1285, 1334 (2001). 
 273. See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 119, at 132; Priest, supra note 271, at 463. 
 274. E.g., Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. 
REV. 1190, 1193–94 n.22 (1996). See Keating, supra note 272, at 1324 (describing Judge Friendly’s 
view that enterprises should be held liable for their characteristic risks because they benefit from the 
imposition of those risks even if liability would not induce precaution). Many enterprise liability 
theories also contend that the cost-pressures of higher insurance premiums create incentives for 
enterprises to take safety precautions for their risky activities. See, e.g., id. at 1320.  
 275. Keating, supra note 272, at 1320. Justice Traynor’s celebrated concurrence in Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944), “afforded prominence both to safety incentives and 
loss-spreading rationales.” Rabin, supra note 274, 1194 n.22. 
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the “rulings and rhetoric of courts across the country and in contemporary 
legal scholarship.”276 
Under an enterprise liability approach, strict liability would effectively 
address the characteristic risks of the private sector’s cyber-reservoirs. In 
much the same way that pollution attends the activities of a chemical 
factory, cyber-security breaches routinely confront database operators. 
Organizations can spread the losses of data-security breaches with cyber-
risk insurance.277 Under enterprise liability theory, strict liability would 
stand as an effective means to distribute the costs of leaking cyber-
reservoirs and to spur accident–preventing measures. 
2.  Justice Approach 
 Justice theories connect tort law to the “doing of justice between the 
parties to the litigation.”278 Some share the nineteenth-century economic 
moralist’s commitment to laissez-faire but within a framework informed by 
a libertarian conception of justice.279 Other justice theories reject a laissez-
faire philosophy and the economic moralist’s intuition that injurers stood 
on equal footing as the injured.280 For instance, fairness theory finds that 
risks are not fairly allocated between enterprises and individuals. Justice 
requires that those who benefit from an activity bear its costs and risks.281 
A fairness approach would defend strict liability as a just price for a 
database operator’s freedom to collect ultrasensitive personal 
information.282 Corrective justice and civil recourse theories, on the other 
 
 276. Keating, supra note 272, at 1333. See also 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 119, at 196 n.19 
(explaining that “loss distribution, based in effect on enterprise liability,” as preferable to negligence 
“has been widely recognized for years” and is not limited “to activities to which strict liability has 
heretofore applied”); NOLAN & URSIN, supra note 245, at 150–51 (suggesting enterprise liability’s 
continuing prominence); Murphy, supra note 175, at 666 (highlighting the vitality of Rylands in the 
twenty-first century to ensure that polluting enterprises pay their way). For examples of contemporary 
scholarship advocating the retention of enterprise liability, see Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, 
Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 692 (1993) 
(offering “new arguments on behalf of old justifications for the expansion of manufacturer liability”); 
William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (1992) 
(discussing same). 
 277. See supra note 239 (discussing the increasing availability and use of cyber-risk insurance). 
 278. John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 564 (2003). 
 279. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 203–04 
(1973). 
 280. See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text (describing the philosophy of the nineteenth 
century’s economic moralists). 
 281. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of 
Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1886–87 (2004). 
 282. See id. at 1887–90. 
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hand, would reject strict liability unless the database operator’s wrongful 
behavior could be presumed in the wake of a data leak.283 This subsection 
addresses each of these theories in turn. 
a.  Libertarians  
Libertarian tort theory would uphold strict liability for data leaks as a 
means to provide just compensation for an individual’s property losses 
caused by the release of sensitive personal data. Libertarian theory 
endeavors to offer a “complete theory of laissez-faire” that acknowledges 
the need for rules governing both “common property and forced 
exchanges.” 284 
Under this theory, a person exercises absolute dominion over his 
person, reputation, and things acquired through his actions.285 If someone 
acts in a manner that injures another’s physical self, possessions, or 
reputation, the injurer owns the loss.286 Because defendants would pay for 
damage inflicted on their own property, justice requires defendants to bear 
the costs if they damage another’s property.287 Thus, an injurer who 
infringes, or impairs the value of, a victim’s property must compensate the 
property owner for the loss as if the loss were the injurer’s own loss. 
The hazards of the release of a person’s SSN or biometric data 
constitute the loss of property under libertarian tort theory. People “own” 
their good credit rating, the personal freedom from an erroneous arrest 
intended for an identity thief, and the right to be free of financial expenses 
to repair their credit.288 Because a database operator would incur losses 
upon the leakage of its own data, it must compensate individuals harmed by 
the release of their personal information. From the libertarian perspective, 
strict liability might ensure that an individual’s property rights are not 
unjustly impaired by database operators. 
 
 283. See Zipursky, supra note 143, at 699–700. 
 284. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL 
LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 3, 320 (1998) (calling for a reinvigoration of laissez-faire 
philosophy); Goldberg, supra note 278, at 564–65. 
 285. Goldberg, supra note 278, at 564–65. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, 
AND UTOPIA 79–84 (1974) (articulating a libertarian theory of a minimal state that upholds one’s 
freedom to engage in risky activities whose benefits outweigh their costs, such as polluting or driving, 
so long as the individuals who benefit from the activities compensate those who bear the costs).  
 286. Goldberg, supra note 278, at 565. 
 287. Richard A. Epstein, Causation—In Context: An Afterword, 63 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 653, 658 
(1987) [hereinafter Epstein, Afterword]; Epstein, supra note 279, at 158. 
 288. Cf. Epstein, Afterword, supra note 287, at 818–19 (explaining that because auction 
aggregators that troll an auction web site, such as eBay, gather information from the site and strain it, 
they interfere with the auction house’s property right to exclude such aggregators; thus, the rules for 
trespass to real property should be imported into cyberspace). 
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b.  Fairness Theory 
Fairness theory also supports a strict-liability solution to the 
Information Era’s leaking cyber-reservoirs. The fairness theory, originated 
by George Fletcher289 and developed by Gregory Keating,290 provides the 
“moral logic” for treating strict enterprise liability as the modern default 
rule for tort law.291 In its prescription of fairness, this theory builds on the 
political philosophy of John Rawls.292 
Fairness requires an enterprise to compensate individuals injured by 
its risky, yet profitable, activities if the victim does not benefit from the 
activities to the same extent that the enterprise does.293 Tort law’s central 
task is to reconcile the need for freedom to impose risks on others with the 
need for security from accidental injury.294 The tension between liberty and 
security, Rawls’s primary goods, must be reconciled in a manner that a 
“plurality of persons with distinct lives and diverse ends and preferences” 
would accept.295 
 
 289. In 1972, George Fletcher propounded the “reciprocity of risk” theory. George P. Fletcher, 
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 540–42 (1972) [hereinafter Fletcher, 
Fairness]. See also George P. Fletcher, Book Review: Corrective Justice for Moderns, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1658, 1677 (1993) (affirming reciprocity of risk theory in reviewing JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS 
AND WRONGS (1992)). For Fletcher, fairness requires compensation for a victim’s injuries if the injurer 
exposed the victim to an unfair amount of risk—that is, more risk than the victim exposed to the injurer. 
See Fletcher, Fairness, supra, at 546–48. Rylands epitomized the reciprocity theory for Fletcher 
because John Rylands imposed a risk on his coal-mining neighbor, Thomas Fletcher, who did not 
impose such risks on him. See id. at 546, 550. Thus, fairness required John Rylands to compensate 
Thomas Fletcher. See id. 
Fletcher’s “reciprocity of risk” paradigm would likely uphold a strict-liability approach to today’s 
insecure cyber-reservoirs. Database operators, in amassing massive collections of sensitive personal 
data in databases, impose risks upon individuals but such individuals do not impose risks on database 
operators. Thus, the database operator’s imposition of nonreciprocal risks upon individuals would 
warrant strict-liability treatment for the harm caused by leaking data under the “reciprocity of risk” 
theory. 
 290. See Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 313–14 (1996) [hereinafter Keating, Reasonableness] (building on the “incomplete” 
reciprocity theory of George Fletcher and Charles Fried). Keating partially rejects Fletcher’s 
“reciprocity of risk” paradigm and offers a different prescription for fairness. See Keating, supra note 
281, at 1887; Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74 
S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 200–01 (2000) [hereinafter Keating, Corrective Justice]; Goldberg, supra note 
278, at 568–69 (describing Keating’s interpretive project as updating Fletcher’s reciprocity theory and 
providing a normative basis for the reciprocity principle based on a “Rawlsian conception of fair terms 
of cooperation among equals”). 
 291. See Keating, Corrective Justice, supra note 290, at 202. 
 292. See Keating, supra note 281, at 1857–58. 
 293. See id. at 1873.  
 294. Id. at 1862–63. 
 295. Id. at 1864–66. 
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When an organization engages in reasonable risky behavior—that is, 
nonwrongful conduct where an injurer’s freedom to impose the risk is more 
valuable than a victim’s forgone security such as reservoirs and blasting—
fairness requires that the injurer pay for the victim’s harm.296 It is 
reasonable for an enterprise to impose nonnegligent risks, but unreasonable 
for it to refuse to pay for the financial costs of its actions.297 Strict liability 
exacts a “just price” for an enterprise’s freedom to engage in profitable 
activities where the victim did not similarly enjoy such a liberty but 
nonetheless suffered injury.298 This is true even where victims participate 
in an enterprise and share in its benefits, but not in the same proportion “to 
the detriment they suffer” when harmed by the enterprise.299 The theory of 
fairness thus prescribes proportionality between the benefits and burdens 
borne by parties.300 
The hazards of the Information Age’s bursting cyber-reservoirs 
demand recompense under the fairness theory. In amassing personal data, 
private entities enjoy appreciable profit-making “freedoms,” such as 
enhanced workplace efficiency, gains from the sale of personal 
information, and a means to solicit potential customers. On balance, the 
degree of benefit to individuals whose information is collected is not 
matched by the detriment they suffer upon the release of their information. 
For example, individuals gain little in having their SSNs collected by an 
information broker but suffer much when their information escapes into the 
hands of an identity thief who commits crimes in their names and mars 
 
 296. See id. at 1871. 
 297. Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 1266, 1328 (1997). See also Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. 
REV. 401, 441 (1959) (articulating moral and fairness grounds for strict liability for hazardous activities 
under the rubric of “unjust enrichment” because “those who benefit by receiving the products of 
blasting activities ought to bear the losses if they can be distributed at a reasonable cost”). 
 298. Keating, supra note 281, at 1891–92. See also MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: 
TORT LAW, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY 8, 11–12 (1977) (arguing that morality and economic 
considerations compel the notion that entrepreneurs whose activities cause harm have a duty to repair 
that harm in return for freedom to act as they wish). 
 299. Keating, supra note 281, at 1891. See also Jones, supra note 276, at 1778 (contending that 
fairness demands that when the enterprise “controls the instrumentality of harm” and the victim is 
“essentially passive” and cannot avoid the harm herself, strict liability should follow); Virginia E. Nolan 
& Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 290 
(1987) (arguing that strict liability for entities whose commercial activities impose hazards on 
individuals is fair because the victim imposed “no similar risk” on the enterprise and lacked the ability 
to protect herself). 
 300. See Keating, supra note 281, at 1858. See also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 300 
(1993) (“Fair terms of cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and mutuality: all who cooperate 
must benefit, or share in common burdens, in some appropriate fashion judged by a suitable benchmark 
of comparison.”). 
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their credit. To place liability on the database operator would fairly 
distribute the costs of the release of such ultrasensitive personal data and 
equalize the burdens and benefits of profitable cyber-reservoirs of data. 
Fairness theory, however, draws a hard line as to the harm it redresses, 
namely physical injury and personal property damage.301 To a certain 
extent, bursting cyber-reservoirs infringe Rawls’s basic liberties and thus 
warrant compensation if the release of sensitive cyber-data resulted in an 
individual’s physical injury at the hands of a stalker or in the loss of an 
individual’s personal property.302 An individual’s arrest for an identity 
thief’s crime would also deprive an individual of personal freedom.303 And 
the loss of a home due to a defaulted secondary mortgage loan of an 
identity thief would constitute personal property damage. To that extent, 
the fairness theory supports strict liability for the bursting cyber-reservoirs 
of the Information Age. 
c.  Corrective Justice and Civil Recourse 
Corrective justice and civil recourse theories sit uncomfortably with 
strict liability. Corrective justice theory embraces an Aristotelian concept 
of justice that requires injurers to make victims whole.304 Defendants, 
however, only bear moral responsibility for their faulty actions.305 Strict 
liability is consistent with corrective justice’s notion of moral agency if an 
actor’s fault can be presumed.306 To that end, injuries caused by 
abnormally dangerous activities, such as operating reservoirs, warrant 
compensation because fault can be imputed from the “very materialization 
 
 301. See Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 290, at 343–44. 
 302. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 
A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003)). 
 303. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61 (1971); Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 
290, at 344. It also might impinge on the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary arrest under 
Rawls’s basic liberties. RAWLS, supra, at 61.  
 304. See COLEMAN, supra note 289, at 320 (corrective justice “imposes the duty to repair the 
wrongs one does” (emphasis omitted)); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56–57 (1995); 
Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 453 (1992) (corrective 
justice erases the wrongful actor’s gain and restores the victim’s loss). 
 305. See WEINRIB, supra note 304, at 64, 76 (developing Aristotle’s notion that corrective justice 
addresses the disturbances of the equality between two parties such that the “injustice that corrective 
justice corrects is essentially bipolar”); Perry, supra note 304, at 453–54. See also Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Philosophy of Tort Law, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 122 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005) (describing varying 
notions of corrective justice theory). 
 306. See WEINRIB, supra note 304, at 187–90. 
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of the risk.”307 In that case, strict liability simply relieves victims from 
identifying the injurer’s faulty acts.308 
Civil recourse theory similarly requires a fault finding to warrant 
redress against a database operator.309 Under civil recourse theory, tort suits 
empower victims to bring private actions against those who commit legal 
wrongs against them.310 Genuine strict liability can be reconciled with 
recourse theory if the principle for adopting no-fault liability stems from 
the notion that wrongdoing is presumed, such as in manufacturing defect 
strict liability where victims face systematic difficulties in proving what 
went wrong in the manufacturing process.311 
The hazardous information reservoirs might merit strict-liability 
treatment under both civil recourse and corrective justice theory if fault 
could be presumed from the circumstances surrounding the release of the 
personal information. For example, a case involving a database operator’s 
posting of SSNs on a website for all the public to see may warrant a 
presumption of faulty behavior by the database operator. Moreover, just as 
plaintiffs have difficulty identifying a defect in a defendant’s 
manufacturing process, victims of data leaks may face great obstacles in 
proving the flaw in a data operator’s information system given the rapidly 
accelerating risk environment. This might support a presumption of fault 
and the concomitant approval of strict liability. 
3.  Formalism 
Contemporary tort scholars rightfully acknowledge the current 
predominance of negligence over strict liability.312 A Rylands solution for 
 
 307. Id. at 188. See also COLEMAN, supra note 289, at 367–68 (arguing that no matter how well 
one maintains an above-ground reservoir, “simply building a reservoir creates unnecessary, and 
therefore unreasonable risks”). 
 308. WEINRIB, supra note 304, at 189. 
 309. See Goldberg, supra note 244, at 601 (conceiving tort law “as a law for the redress of wrongs 
[that] conditions the imposition of liability on conduct that is wrongful toward, and injurious to, the 
victim”); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
1733, 1812–32 (1998); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3, 15–40, 55–70 (1998) (explaining that tort law only contemplates redress where an 
injurer bears a relational duty to a victim and commits a wrong against the victim). 
 310. Zipursky, supra note 143, at 754 (explaining that although civil recourse theory differs from 
corrective justice theory in critical ways, civil recourse theory, like corrective justice theory, takes “the 
offensive—as a superior analysis of the structure of tort doctrine, as a form of justice and political order 
different from distributive justice, . . . and as a critique of instrumentalism”). 
 311. Goldberg, supra note 244, at 598. 
 312. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) 
§ 6 cmts. a, c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (suggesting that the overarching normative principle of tort 
law is negligence); James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 
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leaking cyber-reservoirs, however, would not undermine this trend, but 
would instead carve out a strict-liability exception for the release of 
sensitive personal data from insecure databases.313 Such an approach would 
be consistent with the significant pockets of enterprise liability that remain 
in a variety of tort actions.314 
Some would object to this proposal on the grounds that accident law 
typically confines recovery for injuries resulting in physical harm or 
personal property loss.315 The economic loss doctrine would preclude the 
recovery of pecuniary harm not resulting from bodily or property 
damage.316 The following section argues that just as the industrial 
technologies of the nineteenth century altered the nature of injuries, the 
twenty-first century’s technologies inflict new harms that demand 
recognition, including economic losses to our market identity and 
emotional harm suffered as a result of identity theft. 
 
378–79 (2002); Robert L. Rabin, The Renaissance of Accident Law Plans Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 
699, 716 (2005); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997). See also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: 
AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 276–77 (rev. ed. 2003) (addressing the emergence of negligence over strict 
liability as the dominant standard in manufacturing liability cases). 
 313. Some may argue that in establishing a Rylands claim for bursting cyber-reservoirs, plaintiffs 
would face significant practical problems proving causation. Although this Article does not attempt to 
resolve this question, a few preliminary notes can be made. Many contemporary theories that might 
uphold strict liability also would dispense with the individual causation requirement. See Guido 
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 
69, 105 (1975) (suggesting that any requirement for proof of causation should be obviated when public 
policy demands); Gifford, supra note 244, at 881–87 (exploring several tort scholars’ rejection of the 
notion that a particular victim needs to identify a particular injurer to recover). Concerns about 
causation also may be somewhat alleviated by the adoption of data-breach notification statutes. Such 
notices would help victims identify the cyber-reservoir that leaked their sensitive personal data. Menn, 
supra note 19 (noting that 800 individuals were victimized by identity thieves as a result of a data-
security breach at ChoicePoint in 2005). Plaintiffs also might invoke cases where manufacturers of 
mass products were held liable without proof of individual causation under “industry-wide” or market-
share liability theories. See Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases 
Resulting from Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 654–55 (2005). 
 314. See WHITE, supra note 312, at 253 (noting that enterprise liability endures in many areas of 
tort law, including liability for abnormally dangerous activities). 
 315. Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 290, at 433. 
 316. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS § 8 (Preliminary Draft 
No. 1, 2005) (“[A]n actor who accidentally causes pecuniary harm to another that does not result from a 
wrongful injury to the person or property of the other is subject to liability in tort for neglect of a duty 
of care to the other only as stated in §§ 9–21.”); 4 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR 
S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 25.18A-25.18D (2d ed. 1986). 
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D.  TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY HARM 
Our conception of injury must undergo change in the twenty-first 
century. “Tort law is both premised on and sends messages about the worth 
of individuals.”317 In the twentieth century, accidents mangled bodies, 
flooded property, and emitted pollution.318 An individual’s self-worth 
stemmed, in many respects, from the individual’s ability to work. Tort law, 
in turn, provided protection and compensation for injuries to those whose 
livelihoods depended on their physical bodies and property. 
At the dawn of this Information Age, individuals define themselves by 
their interactions and integrity in the marketplace.319 Impaired credit due to 
the release of ultrasensitive information to an identity thief compromises an 
individual’s personal independence and self-respect in much the same way 
that a deprivation of personal property does.320 A people’s liberty to hold 
their good names, credit, and work free of impersonation is crucial to the 
development of their personalities.321 
Moreover, an individual’s personal independence is deeply 
compromised when the individual wrestles with the loss of control that 
identity theft, and the fear of it, engenders.322 Emotional distress arising 
from identity theft impairs an individual’s ability to pursue their 
conceptions of the good life.323 Just as Holmes recognized the shift from 
 
 317. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 174 (1992). 
 318. See WITT, supra note 180, at 141–42. 
 319. See Richard S. Markovitz, Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the Corrective-
Justice-Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-based Society, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 243, 245, 268–69 
(explaining that the recognition of libel, slander, defamation, and privacy actions suggests that tort law 
recognizes harm caused by an injurer’s interference with an individual’s right to lead a life of moral 
integrity). 
 320. See RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 59 (John J. Lalor trans., 2d ed. 1915) 
(“Property is but the periphery of my person extended to things.”). See generally Margaret Jane Radin, 
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (conceiving personal property as an extension 
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Back Again, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 363, 374 (1987) (suggesting that Nozick could argue that Rawls’s basic 
liberties include a wider conception of property rights than Rawls acknowledges because the “rights to 
use and dispose of property yield much more self-respect than limited rights”). 
 322. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort 
Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1587 (1997) (arguing that emotional suffering stunts a person’s 
capacity to flourish). 
 323. See Levit, supra note 317, at 189–90. I recognize the possibility that ultrasensitive plaintiffs 
may attempt to recover emotional distress damages for the leakage of their data. See Keating, 
Reasonableness, supra note 290, at 344 n.114, 347 (contending that although purely emotional harm is 
central to an individual’s personality, its exclusion from tort law’s protection is justified because such 
damages would put society at the mercy of the emotionally hyperactive). The possibility of 
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the interpersonal wrongs of the eighteenth century to the mass industrial 
risks of the nineteenth century, the law should adapt to account for injuries 
to our changed conception of personhood in the twenty-first century. 
Although this Article proposes a Rylands solution for leaking cyber-
reservoirs, other hazards of the Information Age may have Industrial Age 
analogues. Rather than meeting the challenges of the Information Age with 
new or inadequate standards, we can learn much about how to address the 
risks of the new technologies of the Information Age from the lessons of 
the Industrial Age. The current crisis of escaping sensitive personal data 
illustrates the compelling need for a strict-liability standard for information 
security much as it was needed to address the bursting reservoirs of the 
Industrial Age. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The new information technologies challenge our conception of 
accidents and injuries. Their diverse new risks include the uncontrolled 
release of sensitive personal information from insecure computer databases 
into the hands of hackers, dishonest employees, and other criminals. The 
escape of such personal data brings the threat of identity theft, criminal 
impersonation, stalking, and corporate espionage. These risks require a 
solution. 
Congress is considering proposals, both modest and wide sweeping, to 
address the hazards of gathering massive troves of digital personal data. 
Public choice analysis, however, suggests that meaningful federal 
legislation is unlikely in the face of strong interest-group opposition to 
restrictions on the collection of personal data. The insights of public choice 
theorists may be particularly apt here as members of Congress rely on these 
very databases in their reelection campaigns. 
An appropriate private law response cannot be found in negligence. 
The contours of a negligence regime are simply too uncertain, and inherent 
problems with its enforcement undermines optimal deterrence. Instead, a 
solution can be found in the lessons of the past. The strict-liability approach 
of the Industrial Age’s Rylands v. Fletcher provides a potent metaphor to 
conceptualize the characteristic risks of new technologies at the dawn of a 
new economic era. America embraced Rylands once it became clear that a 
strict-liability response was critical to addressing the escalating hazards of 
 
ultrasensitive plaintiffs, however, ought not to preclude recovery for emotional harm given the 
importance of emotional health to human flourishing and a jury’s ability to identify a plaintiff’s 
ultrasensitive nature and, in turn, award damages fairly. 
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bursting reservoirs and that industry could afford such a standard. Now, as 
then, the maturity of the new technology-driven economic sector, along 
with many contemporary tort theories, support strict liability for today’s 
insecure cyber-reservoirs of personal data. 
This solution finds its place in the trajectory of tort law over the past 
150 years. Although tort law has veered between fault and strict liability, 
the inadequacy of negligence in this circumstance demands a strict-liability 
solution. The embrace of this solution requires updating our conception of 
harm to the conditions of the twenty-first century. The prominence of 
market identity to our conception of personhood in the Information Age 
demands an effective remedy when that identity is ruined. A return to 
Rylands can facilitate that remedy. 
While this Article suggests a private law solution for the twenty-first 
century’s hazardous information reservoirs, it may also have other, more 
general implications. Unlike in the Industrial Age where the views of 
instrumentalists clashed with justice-minded theorists, here instrumental 
and justice theories come together in support of a strict-liability regime. 
Other twenty-first century accidents may find similar convergence of those 
theories that deserve exploration. 
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